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 Abstract 
Since Ravenstein´s “Laws of Migration”, migration research and theories have developed 
significantly to look at migration from a variety of angles. My research question centers on 
the hypothesis that, despite these developments, social factors are still underrepresented in 
much of migration research and mostly assumed to be merely “side-players” in a 
community´s or individual´s decision whether to migrate. If they are taken into account at 
all, it is primarily in the study of transnational family networks, or integration processes in 
the destination country. The here presented case study of Tham Hin, one of the current nine  
Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, is an example of the importance of including social 
conditions in the home community as well. I discuss various migration models to support my 
hypothesis. Further, I outline the context in which the empirical example is situated, 
meaning the political situation of refugees in Thailand and their position therein. The plight 
of the Hmong refugees in Thailand at the end of the Indochina war is also contrasted with 
the current situation of Burmese refugees, situations that resemble each other in some ways 
but at the same time differ significantly in others, especially in regard to resettlement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 Acknowledgements 
I am very grateful to my thesis supervisor, Professor Wolfram Schaffar, who helped guide me 
through the whole process and to stay focused on my main hypothesis. Thanks also to 
Professor Petra Dannecker, who encouraged me from the beginning to focus on this issue of 
migration theories. 
I am also grateful to the whole team of UNHCR`s field office in Kanchanaburi Thailand, as 
well as to UNHCR Bangkok for not only giving permission to use the Tham Hin survey in my 
thesis, but also  for answering questions that came up during the writing process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 Abbreviations 
CCSDPT  Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand 
IOM   International Organization for Migration  
IRC  International Rescue Committee 
FGD  Focus Group Discussion 
KNU  Karen National Union 
OPE  Overseas Processing Entity 
PAB  Provincial Administration Board 
RTG  Royal Thai Government 
RSC  Resettlement Support Center 
RST  Resettlement 
SPDC  State Peace and Development Council 
SLORC  State Law and Order Restoration Council 
TBBC  Thai Burma Border Consortium  
THI  Tham Hin camp 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 Table of Contents 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….iii 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………….……………………………………………….…iv  
Abbreviations………………………………………….………………………………………………………….….….v 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. On the emergence of refugees ............................................................................ 6 
2.1. On resettlement issues ..................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.1. Regarding US resettlement ................................................................................................. 20 
3. Thailand´s first challenge: Indochina refugee influx ........................................... 23 
3.1. The case of the Laos Hmong ............................................................................................. 24 
4. Refugees´ position in Thailand ........................................................................... 34 
4.1. The Royal Thai Government´s policies ............................................................................... 34 
4.2. An historical overview on Burmese developments ............................................................. 38 
4.2.1. Camp establishments and developments since the 1990s .................................................. 41 
5. Theorizing movements – a discussion of migration theories  ............................. 48 
5.1. Hypothesis: Social aspects tend to be neglected ................................................................ 56 
6. Concretizing theory – the case of Tham Hin camp .............................................. 57 
6.1. Background – Tham Hin camp .......................................................................................... 57 
6.2. Survey design ................................................................................................................... 62 
6.2.1. Problems encountered ......................................................................................................... 67 
6.3. Data analysis – methodology ........................................................................................... 69 
6.4. Interpretation .................................................................................................................. 71 
6.4.1. Regarding a) Social ties and obligations ............................................................................. 72 
6.4.2. Regarding b) Coping worries ............................................................................................... 79 
6.4.3. Regarding Group c) Contention ........................................................................................... 80 
6.4.4. Regarding Group d) Passiveness ......................................................................................... 81 
6.4.5. Regarding e) No understanding .......................................................................................... 82 
6.5. Conclusion on results ........................................................................................................ 83 
7. Food for thought: Social dynamics and cohesion ............................................... 85 
8. Conclusion – lessons learnt (?) ........................................................................... 92 
9. Appendices ....................................................................................................... 95 
 9.1. Appendix I: Worldwide UNHCR Resettlement Submissions vs. Departures 2003-2010 ......... 95 
9.2. Appendix II: Camp population numbers 2007-2011 ............................................................ 96 
9.3. Appendix III: UNHCR Resettlement numbers ..................................................................... 96 
9.4. Appendix IV: Questions of Focus Group Discussions ........................................................... 97 
9.5. Appendix V: Map of Thai refugee camps ........................................................................... 98 
9.6. Appendix VI:  Map of Karen settlements ........................................................................... 99 
10. References .................................................................................................... 100 
Thesis Summary ..................................................................................................................... 109 
Diplomarbeits-Zusammenfassung .......................................................................................... 110 
Lebenslauf ............................................................................................................................. 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Case Study: A 44 year old married woman with six children has not  
considered resettlement. She prefers to remain in the camp and see if the 
situation  
in Myanmar, where her father siblings still live, will improve.1  
 
 
Even in the most basic theories about migration, there is an inherent assumption that 
people in the “Global South” are eager to move at the first opportunity, and that this 
decision is foremost a “rational choice” decision, depending in the largest part on 
economic considerations. This assumption, which applies to economic migrants 
moving from the periphery to the central developed states, is even more assumed for 
refugees, considering their often precarious, inhumane living conditions, in crowded 
camps with little possibilities for any improvements. It seems only natural, therefore, 
to assume that these groups of the most vulnerable would be eager to move at the 
first opportunity offered, even at the cost of making large sacrifices in order to 
become one of the “lucky few” able to move on. In regard to refugee situations, 
foremost in Africa, this seemed unfortunately to been confirmed in scandals involving 
UNHCR staff with taking bribes for resettlement placements.2  
Over the years, we have seen not much of this assumption change, and the picture of 
“Europe as the El Dorado of the welfare state”, beleaguered by the less-fortunate of 
the developing world” is ever-dominant – from a European perspective, there is a 
long list for “them” to come to “us”.  
Against this hype, however, the reality looks much different. Indeed, only a very small 
minority of migrants and refugees are actually arriving in “the West”, or even trying 
to get there – the majority of both groups only move to neighboring countries, which 
are often as poor as their home region. Indeed, only a small proportion of any 
                                                      
1
 Smith/UNHCR 2010:1; exemplary case study from Tham Hin survey, see chapter 6. 
2
 As allegedly happened in UNHCR Nairobi, Kenya (cf. Frederiksson 2002:3). 
2 
 
 
“emigration country” would see migration to “the West” or “the North” as the best 
solution to their everyday problems, and this applies as well to the direst situations as 
we see in many refugee camps. Therefore, even if “Fortress Europe” would open its 
gates completely, the fear of an “inrush of people” is unjustified – most people, even 
in developing countries, are, just as in “the North”, simply too very firmly rooted in 
their own communities.3  
This paper is the outcome of a survey done by UNHCR in Tham Hin camp, one of the 
nine Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, which had the aim of creating a clearer 
picture as to why such a relatively large proportion of eligible refugees didn’t chose to 
resettle, even when they were presented with this opportunity. More precisely, the 
survey found that less than half of eligible refugees in Tham Hin didn’t come forward 
for resettlement at the start of the US resettlement program in the camp and only 
over the next years until the program´s closure in 2009 did this number grow slowly. 
This therefore contradicts the general assumptions about refugee communities 
stated above.  
Consequently, my research evolved from the Tham Hin survey, having been involved 
with it during an internship with the UNHCR field office in Kanchanaburi between July 
and September 2010. My aim is to contribute to the literature challenging the general 
notion that migrants, or refugees, are completely untied individuals, whose only aim 
is to escape their situation at the first chance available. Contrarily, I argue that this 
picture is incorrect, as it negates the existence of social bonds or other ties that may 
influence an individual’s choice on whether or not to move. This paper shall add its 
part to the discussion on migration theories by stressing the role of social factors in 
the process of migration. I hope that this paper and the case study contained within 
contributes to challenge the cliché that a “fortress Europe” is necessary and bolsters 
the concept  that any theory which neglects to look at the social “fabric” inherent in 
any community is likely to be ineffective in trying to control, influence or predict 
migration movements.  
                                                      
3
 Cf. Hammar 1997:1;21 
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In order to provide a better picture of resettlement in general and its role in refugee 
situations, I will commence chapter two by outlining the situation regarding refugees 
in general, including the emergence of refugee movements and their subsequent 
position in the international arena. Upon this, the focus will be on resettlement, 
followed by an outline of the US` role in resettlement, as the US have always been 
one of the biggest players in this matter. 
When looking at the Burmese refugee situation today, it is important to remember 
the situation of the Hmong refugees in Thailand, following the Indochina war in the 
1970s and onwards. In many respects the two communities resemble each other, 
however the way the Hmong situation was eventually resolved differs markedly from 
what we see today in the context of the Burmese.  Therefore in chapter three, I will 
outline the process surrounding the resettlement of the last remaining Hmong 
refugees who stayed in the Wat Thamkrabok temple compound until as recent as 
2010, when  finally getting resettled as well. Comparing the eventual resettlement of 
this last group of Hmong with the Burmese resettlement situation today is giving us a 
good idea about what it depends on whether a resettlement operation is efficient.  
Literature in this context centers either on “America´s forgotten allies”4, meaning the 
Hmong fighters who aided the US troops in Laos but were subsequently left behind to 
fend for themselves under the stringent Prathet Lao government, or it puts the 
spotlight on the US “airlifiting” of Hmong fighters, to provide them with a safe haven 
in the US. The latter includes extensive literature on various Hmong ethnic 
communities in the US and other resettlement countries (surprisingly even in one 
small rural community in southern Germany), as to the process of integration and 
coping in their new environment.  
Little research exists for conditions in the refugee camps themselves along the Thai-
Lao border, and especially in the last remaining “camp” at Wat Thamkrabok. For an 
outline on the situation Grigoleit (2006), Fink DeVivo (2005), as well as the Hmong 
Resettlement Task Force of Wisconsin (2004 and 2005) provide relevant insights into 
developments at the Wat.  
                                                      
4
 Benjamin Zawacki has covered and campaigned for this issue continuously; see e.g. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,447253,00.html  
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In order to understand the context in which the nine camps exist in Thailand, it makes 
sense to provide a brief outline of the political situation of refugees in Thailand. As 
such, I have outlined the government´s stance and refugees´ position in chapter four.  
This is followed by an outline of the developments in Burma that have led to the very 
establishments of the camps, going back to the 1980s, since which there have been 
considerable changes. Extensive literature exists for both of these areas. For example, 
Lang (2002) provides an extensive historical overview of developments in Burma 
since British rule, including the military´s strategies that have led to the establishment 
of the camps in Thailand. Further, the UNHCR, as one of the main actors in refugee 
protection concerns in Thailand, also offers up to date information on relevant issues. 
As there are recurrent critiques on Thailand´s migrant workers and refugee policies, 
various NGO´s and other organizations publish frequent articles and updates on these 
very issues.5  
Following on this, I will discuss major migration theories and their respective focus 
points in chapter five, drawing on authors as Parnreiter (2000), Hammar (1997),  
Massey (1993), Sassen (1991) and Castles/Miller (2009), who have all written 
extensively on international migration and various aspects thereof.  This shall be the 
main body of the thesis and it will further underline its core  hypothesis through 
detailing the neglect of social factors in these popular theories.  
Subsequently in chapter six, the empirical example of Tham Hin camp – based upon 
the survey done in 2010—will be the focus. I will brief the reader on the background 
situation of Tham Hin camp, its community composition and management structure, 
as well as the actors involved and, of course, the resettlement situation in the camp. 
This will be followed by an outline of the survey design and the methodology 
developed and used by UNHCR during the survey.  The focus of the UNHCR was 
rather “technically-oriented”, meaning that the intention was to find out reasons for 
non-resettlement which could then be used to improve UNHCR´s approach in the 
                                                      
5
 See for example Therese M. Caouette and Mary E. Pack: “Pushing past the definitions: Migration from 
Burma to Thailand” (2002),  repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3163, 
and Margaret Green-Rauenhorst/Karen Jacobsen and Sandee Pyne: “Invisible in Thailand. 
Documenting the need for international protection for Burmese” (2008), 
www.phamit.org/download/Invisible%20in%20Thailand.pdf 
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camp. In order to look at the material from a more sociological angle I have also used 
Mayring´s suggestions for encoding the data, as to develop five of what I have called 
“reason-types” for non-resettlement. Further knowledge on analyzing interviews and 
group discussions were drawn from Mayer (2009) and Gläser/Laudel (2009). 
 Finally also in chapter 6 the description of results, centering on statements by 
participants of the survey, will be discussed in detail. Likewise, I have drawn on a 
study of the faculty of sociology of the Ruhr-University Bochum (Germany) in order to 
test possible connections in a grid structure consisting of different variables.  
Based on the main conclusions of the survey in terms of social factors, chapter seven 
will look at the dynamics inherent in a refugee camp environment, as well as the 
structure that determines social relations between the various actors involved and 
the camp population. Namely, flight itself and the circumstances of living in an – often 
crowded – refugee camp are traumatic experiences that influence the camp 
community; further, self-perceptions of refugees themselves may impact on the 
decision whether or not to resettle. New hierarchies in a refugee community and the 
way individuals place themselves within it are established, which also are likely to 
change women´s role in this society and their status of authority.  
In finality, chapter eight holds the conclusion of the paper.  
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2. On the emergence of refugees 
 
„Mass migrations of peoples have always occurred; however, `refugees` are a creation 
of the twentieth century state.”
6
 
Migration of people is nothing particular to the 20th century, nor is the existence of 
refugees per se; however, the emergence of “refugees” on such a large scale as we 
see today can be attributed to developments at the end of the Second World War, as 
well as the end of the Cold War. 
As Anderson (1991) has pointed out with his concept of “imagined communities”, the 
importance placed on national boundaries, which brought along permanent 
passports, identity papers and mapping were the decisive prerequisites that made 
the emergence of refugees, as we know them today, only possible. Here, the basic 
condition for counting as a refugee is the crossing of a national border, without which 
an individual may “only” count as an internally displaced person (IDP).7 
The end of World War II saw thousands across Europe being persecuted, driven from 
their homes and dispersed in the chaos of war. These circumstances conditioned the 
establishment of the UNHCR in 1951, which on the onset was thought to be an only 
temporary agency.8 Essentially, the scale of these displacements, their ever increasing 
duration as well as the growing importance of territorial states and nations´ 
sovereignty were decisive factors in the establishment of the Convention. As the scale 
of people fleeing violence and persecution outside of Europe increased as well, 
eventually the 1951 definition had to be widened by adding another Protocol in 
19679, making the definition of who counts as a “refugee” applicable to a worldwide 
level. 10  
                                                      
6
 Malkki 1995, cited in Fink DeVivo 2005:5 
7
 Kalnin 2010:79 
8
 Only quite recently in 2003 was the UNHCR declared to be continuing to exist „until the refugee 
problem is solved“; previously, its mandate had only been extended on a five-year basis (Goodwin-Gill 
2008: n.p.). 
9
 After the 1967 amendment, the definition states that “any person who is outside their country of 
origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, on account of a 
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Up until the mid 1980s the UNHCR system with its definition of who counts as a 
refugee deserving international protection  worked out quite reasonably; basic 
principles regarding human rights and dignities of refugees were respected, and a 
certain degree of burden-sharing of the international community was thought to be a 
necessary duty. However, as the Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the necessity to fund certain “volatile” states was abandoned. As a result of 
the omission of financial contributions from “the West” “state implosions”/state 
collapses followed, which were subsequently followed by persecutions of certain 
groups and many atrocities, producing large flows of refugees moving partly towards 
Western Europe. These flows of refugees became increasingly challenging for the 
UNHCR. 
Moreover, a certain degree of “re-thinking” began to emerge: no more “duties”, but 
more how to avoid these, or at best make them not emerge at all, became the focus 
for many states, especially in the Western hemisphere. As Goodwin-Gill has pointed 
out: “Duties, once freely assumed, are taken less seriously”.11 With the abolition of a 
clearly divided line between the open market-oriented and the communist camp, 
states increasingly focused on themselves instead of the common good of “their” 
team, which became evident with less international cooperation in dealing with 
emerging refugee crises.12 
As Lang has pointed out, “[t]he essential condition of becoming a “refugee” emerges 
with the “rupture of the minimum relationship of protection, trust and loyalty 
between the citizen and the home state” – meaning that the relationship between 
dutiful citizen and “fatherlike” state as a protector is taken away, leaving the 
individual concerned forced to look for sanctuary elsewhere. 13 
                                                                                                                                                         
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
group, or political opinion” (Goodwin-Gill 2008#The Convention Refugee Definition, emphasis added 
by author). 
10
 Fink DeVivo 2005:4 
11
 Goodwin-Gill 2001:1 
12
 Goodwin-Gill 2001:14 
13
 Lang 2002:13ff 
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Such a definition concentrates on the relationship between the state and its citizen; 
however, to encompass the day-to-day activities of involved organizations and actors, 
and to define what concrete conditions make an individual a refugee, a more practical 
definition had to be drawn up. Subsequently, as for the above mentioned 1951 
Geneva definition, an essential aspect of its formulation was to agree on a common 
definition on who would be regarded by all state parties involved as a “refugee” 
deserving international protection. As the convention was done under the 
background of the Second World War, its focus was on European persons fleeing 
fighting and acts of violence in connection to events occurring prior to January 1st 
1951. However, as a matter of fact this approach proved to be too inadequate in the 
years to come and had therefore to be expanded in 1967 to include all persons 
fleeing fighting, irrespective of origin and of a time deadline. 
Subsequently, this widened definition still stands until today as the most widely 
spread definition on which UNHCR refugee status determination procedures are 
based, as well as most countries´ criteria who counts as a “refugee”. 14 However, 
there is quite extensive discussion about the limitations of this definition, particularly 
the importance of having a “well-founded fear of persecution” is very often argued to 
be too subjective: especially making the decision of awarding refugee status to an 
individual dependent on something as subjective as “fear” has always draws immense 
criticism. Suddenly this very subjective emotion has to be judged objectively by law 
authorities, judges and other decision makers who are at times not accustomed to 
refugee law or know little about an individual´s cultural background or conditions in 
the home country that may have led to the departure.   Additionally, the necessity for 
adequate interpreters is not always acknowledged, which understandably makes 
judging this “well-founded fear of prosecution” too often bordering on randomness 
and the good- or badwill of the authorities in charge. Moreover, the 1951 definition 
had been drawn up on the basis that individuals who flee from political persecution 
should be granted protection; however, even though political activism is still often 
the main reason for persecution and subsequent flight, a rather new development of 
our time is that today´s refugees often seek protection because of attacks by 
                                                      
14
 Fink DeVivo 2005:4ff. 
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government or non-governmental actors, irrespective of any engagement in active 
political opposition – a situation that also fits for the case of a large part of Burmese 
refugees. Individuals or groups are targeted as “mere victims”, not necessarily on the 
basis of social, cultural or other differences but nevertheless in a way that leaves no 
other choice for survival other than to leave one´s homeland.15 Especially this third 
category of randomly targeted individuals is an inherent feature of many refugee 
situations of today, especially seen in Africa or South America.  
Therefore, the continuing wars and war-like situations in Africa and Latin-America, 
which frequently witness large numbers of people fleeing fighting and grave human 
rights violations, finally called for a more regionally adequate version of the original 
definition. Subsequently in 1969 and 1984 respectively the OAU Refugee Convention 
as well as the Cartagena Declaration were created, trying to adapt the original 
definition to make it more applicable in a distinct African or Latin American context.  
Instead of emphasizing the need of a certain “deliberateness” of targeting an 
individual, these two definitions rather stress the persecution of more or less random 
groups of people who are forced to flee from either an outside aggressor, occupation, 
foreign domination or “events that seriously disturb public order”. In this way, the 
special situations in Africa and Latin America, which often include hard to identify 
warring factions that don’t necessarily target only one specific group, have been 
addressed. 16 
However, even though discussions surrounding the definition of who counts as a 
refugee are frequently debated, one core principle is inherent in all definitions and 
can be seen as the “basic” principle of refugee protection: Namely the provision of 
non-refoulement (enshrined also in the 1951 Geneva Convention). Essentially, this 
refers to the principle that no individual should be sent back to his or her country of 
origin if there is a fear that this might endanger his or her life or well-being (e.g. in the 
case of the threat of torture).17 
                                                      
15
 Lang 2002:13ff 
16
 Schreier 2008:55;57; Goodwin-Gill 2008 
17
 Exact wording acc. to the Geneva Convention (Article 33): „No Contracting State shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
10 
 
 
This key principle of non-refoulement was also included in other international 
treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well as of course the above 
mentioned African and Latin American documents regarding refugees.  Thus, even if 
countries such as Thailand haven’t signed the Geneva Convention, they are 
nevertheless expected by customary international law to abide by this principle. 
Considering the almost regular deportations of Burmese nationals from Thailand, 
there is frequent critique regarding Thailand´s breach of this basic provision of 
customary law. 
However, as concerning the definition of “refugees”, even the principle of non-
refoulement is frequently subject of discussion. Mainly, this discussion has been 
introduced by states that are concerned about subversion of their national 
sovereignty, as well as if there is a threat to national security. It is also unclear if the 
principle of non-refoulement applies equally to persons trying to enter a country as 
those being deported. 18 
As is evidence by the breakings of this principle of non-refoulement by various states, 
refugee protection was from the beginning and still is today subordinate to state 
sovereignty – to provide refugee protection has been agreed upon on the condition 
that the “final word” still belongs to the respective state, rendering refugee 
protection and the Geneva Convention essentially open to the same “toothless” 
criticism as, for example, the principle of Human Right law.19 Moreover, even though 
UNHCR is seen as non-political, in reality it has proven itself to be highly political: 
namely, there can be no UNHCR intervention for humanitarian or other assistance if 
the government concerned rejects such assistance. Further, as the agency´s efforts 
would be impossible without due financial contributions by member states, this has 
                                                                                                                                                         
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”(Rodger 2002:II B) 
18
 Rodger 2002: II B 
19
 Rodger 2002: II B 
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created high dependency on state policies and allows the UNHCR to be shaped to a 
large degree by these forces.20  
At the beginning of 2009 there were approx.  36 Million persons of concern to UNHCR 
, this being the highest figure since the agency´s inception. However, according to the 
aforementioned definition, “persons of concern” does not necessarily only mean 
“refugees” but also includes stateless persons, refugees returning home and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs).  The number of refugees benefiting from UNHCR 
assistance in 2009 stood at around 10,4 Million persons.  However, as with all official 
numbers, UNHCR figures have to be taken with care: Jeff Crisp points out that, 
“UNHCR statistics can be the result of negotiation between the Office and the host 
government, and typically include only those refugees under the mandate of 
UNHCR”. This means that in cases where e.g. the host state hinders more persons 
from entering designated camps (managed by UNHCR), this of course decreases the 
number of persons under the UN mandate. However at the same time, refugee 
numbers are distorted as official figures only include these persons under UNHCR-
protection in these camps, neglecting those that were hindered from entering the 
camps.  . Further, as can be seen in the case of Burmese in Thailand, the divide 
between economic migrants and refugees is quite often blurred: many potential 
refugees live hidden in urban areas, rather than staying in the camps required by 
many host governments, as e.g. in Thailand. Such policies, therefore, do have an 
impact on UNHCR numbers21.22 
Despite the sometimes prevailing assumption about two thirds of all refugees 
worldwide are living in developing countries, mostly fleeing only to an imminent 
neighborhood country or to a country at best within their own continent. 23 
                                                      
20
 Loescher 2001:28 
21
 Loescher et al 2008:22f 
See also: Crisp, Jeff 1999: “`Who has counted the Refugees?`: UNHCR and the Politics of Numbers”, 
New Issue in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 12, Geneva: UNHCR, June 1999. 
22
 This shows again UNHCR´s status of being to a high degree a “playball” subject to government 
intentions and good-will.  
23
 UNHCR 2009c:17f 
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Within these environments of refuge, many end up living in crowded camps under 
rather inhumane conditions; not seldom do they get stuck in limbo. Subsequently, 
there has been a great demand for a solution, especially with protracted refugee 
situations which have seen generations grow up in camp environments. 
For such long-standing situations such as this there are generally three options 
available, which are known as “durable solutions” by UNHCR standards. Primarily, 
whenever possible and deemed safe, voluntary repatriation to the home country is 
seen as the most desirable solution for all stakeholders. Secondly, if the opportunity 
of local integration is given (meaning permitted on the host governments´ side), this 
could be an option for at least part of the refugee community. However, these 
options are not always available, which often makes the third solution, resettlement 
to a third country, the most attractive and the most realistic solution.  
 
2.1. On resettlement issues 
Myth: Most refugees want to be resettled. Truth: Most refugees want to go 
home. 
Resettlement is for refugees who have no other solution.
24
 
 
“Resettlement”, by definition, refers to “[T]he transfer of refugees and stateless 
people from the country in which they have sought refuge to another state that has 
agreed to admit them as refugees and/or to grant permanent settlement there.”
25  
On a more operational level this means several “practical” stages, compromised of 
case identification, needs assessment, identity validation, eligibility determination 
and processing, transportation and passage, and then eventual integration into the 
receiving community, with special emphasis being placed on resettlement as an 
orderly process, against other forms of migration as being more “unpredictable”, or 
                                                      
24
 UNHCR 2010d:4 
25
 UNHCR 2009a:1 
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“random”.26 For all the above steps, various actors are involved, being responsible for 
respective parts of the whole complicated process of transferring an individual from 
country A to country B. As has been pointed out, under their refugee protection 
mandate, UNHCR is highly involved in this process and cooperates at almost every 
stage with various NGOs and governmental stakeholders. Another main actor without 
most resettlement operations would be unthinkable is the IOM (International 
Organization for Migration), which, depending on the respective host country, 
manages pre-departure cultural orientation programs and very essentially the 
logistics of movements. Apart from these two rather big players, the IOM and the 
UNHCR, several other NGOs are involved in the process.   
Throughout the 1980s actual resettlement numbers were much higher than what we 
see today. The foremost reason for this was that the war in Indochina produced 
massive flows of refugees pouring into neighboring countries, amongst those 
Thailand, which were quite generously resettled to Western third countries. 
Vietnamese refugees alone numbered approx. 700,000, who were for the largest part 
eventually resettled overseas. The number of actually resettled persons has gone 
down since then, with annual numbers standing at less than 80,000 annually for all 
resettlement-receiving countries combined. However, figures for refugees in need of 
resettlement stay high and have even risen during the previous years: UNHCR 
estimates that approx.  780,00027 refugees will be in need of resettlement over the 
next 3 to 5 years, a number which nevertheless only accounts for less than 10% of all 
refugees worldwide. For 2011 alone, needed placements have been estimated to be 
approx. 172,000 – basically, for every 100 refugees in need of resettlement, merely 
10 get resettled each year.28 At the Annual Tripartite Consultation on Resettlement in 
July 2011, the head of UNHCR´s resettlement division Wei-Meng Lim-Kabaa warned 
that under current conditions, about 100,000 refugees in need of resettlement will be 
left without a solution in 2011.29 
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Appendix I shows UNHCR submission numbers and subsequent acceptance numbers; 
as can be seen from the divergence, only about half, if not less, of all proposed cases 
for resettlement actually get resettled in the end, suggesting that even though states 
might mostly adhere to UNHCR recommendations regarding who they should focus 
on taking in, final admission numbers are nevertheless quite significantly low.  
Until today, the US is the largest refugee receiver. Nevertheless, how dire the 
resettlement placement situation is at present can be seen from a US example: In 
2008 the ceiling of US resettlement admissions has been put at 80,000 placements – 
UNHCR figures put places actually available for UNHCR referred resettlement to the 
US at 56,750; however, eventually resettled refugees to the US in 2008 have only 
been 48,828 persons.30 This demonstrates that the national maximum admittance 
number for resettlement is not achieved, and that also not all refugees that the 
UNHCR suggests for resettlement are taken in eventually.  
Again in 2009, out of an expected arrival of 75,000 according to a US government 
report, actual arrivals have been 62,011 persons, according to UNHCR numbers.31 
What is striking about the above figures is that actual UNHCR submissions for persons 
in need of resettlement in the US have been 94,590 and 102,586 persons for 2008 
and 2009 respectively. 32 While naturally there ought to be some divergence between 
submissions and consequent acceptance numbers, the gap between these two 
figures seems to be widening over the last couple of years.33 
Overall, refugee submission rates have been generally increasing in the new 
millennium, with an all-times high in 2009 (128,000 persons submitted, up from 
121,000 in 2008 and decreasing slightly to 108,082 in 2010), which is mostly due to 
improved UNHCR and NGO staff competencies in their identification of vulnerable 
persons of concern and in the better communications between field and head 
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offices32F34.  However, as has been noted already, state admissions do not keep step 
with the submission rate, and this remains to be the major problem. Due to this fact, 
the UNHCR had announced an increase of 10% in receiving states´ resettlement 
numbers as one of its major focus points for the period 2010-2011.35 
Another point of concern which has been raised in recent times by UNHCR relates to 
the time of processing resettlement cases: the average duration of a “normal” case 
from submission by UNHCR to the receiving state concerned until the actual 
departure of the individual or the family should take approx. 12 months; however, in 
so called emergency cases, usually when the refugee concerned is in bad health or 
other dangerous circumstances, the processing time ought to be cut if possible to 
only several days until departure. This has proven not to be the case most of the time, 
with delays for screening, health and security checks etc. holding up the process, 
resulting in procedures taking an average about five months/140 days from 
submission to departure. This situation has been exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks in 
2001, which created an additional increase in processing time due to even more 
rigorous security screenings. Also, due to increasingly strict criteria and screening 
procedures for such urgent cases, the total of 700 slots available in 2009 for such 
cases could not be utilized completely. For example, out of 1,022 persons submitted 
by UNHCR in 2009, only 653 persons eventually departed to a third country.36  
Major departure countries (countries of first asylum from which refugees are 
resettling), as well as major countries of origin (refugees` home countries) haven´t 
changed much in the last couple of years; Nepal still ranks first regarding numbers of 
individuals submitted for resettlement, although numbers for Thailand fell out of the 
top three of departure countries, being replaced by Malaysia in 2010 (however, 
country of origin is still the same, namely Burma). Therefore, regarding nationalities 
affected, there haven’t been any changes in recent years, with Iraqi refugees being 
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the most prominent population of refugees worldwide, followed by Burmese and 
Bhutanese refugees.35F37 
Not every country which might accept asylum seekers on their “doorstep” has an 
official resettlement program in place; up through the current day, the United States 
still stands at the largest taker with resettlement acceptance numbers. Other 
prominent resettlement countries have included Canada, the northern European 
countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand. However, recent years have seen 
countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, amongst others, as well as the UK and 
France build up or reinstall their resettlement programs. Germany has also enacted 
an ad hoc resettlement program since 2009.338   Relevant in the Asian context is the 
pilot project which Japan started in 2010, under which for three years 30 Burmese 
from one of the Thai camps will annually be resettled to Japan.39 
However, connected to the problem of resettlement places available, European 
countries´ share up to today has been relatively minor, providing for only 13% in 2009 
of overall places needed, an increase from merely 9% in 2007. Even though joining 
only in 2009, Germany had the highest number of acceptances as of 2009 (2,064 
persons), thanks to special ad hoc admissions for mostly Iraqi refugees.40 
Even though resettlement itself might be seen as a relatively “easy” means of 
relieving the plight of refugees worldwide, the process of moving individuals or 
families from place A to B must be understood as a process that not only includes 
refugees themselves and the receiving country, but also must include the host 
government´s cooperation and support as well, making the whole procedure of 
resettling refugees a complex process where dialogue, coordination and mutual 
understanding is crucial in achieving durable outcomes.  
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 Further, for refugees themselves there exists neither a „right to resettlement“, nor 
any obligation on receiving state´s side to accept any number of refugees or other 
persons in need (e.g. stateless persons). Admission criteria, as well as numbers, are at 
the sole discretion of the receiving state and its national resettlement policies. 
However, most major receiving countries orient their policies towards 
recommendations set by UNHCR; thus, receiving governments usually work together 
on a regular basis with UNHCR and generally accept refugees deemed eligible by 
UNHCR screening processes.  
This sole discretion of state´s decision on resettlement slots available proves to be 
one of the major “dilemmas” regarding refugee resettlement: On the one hand 
stands UNHCR´s core mandate and responsibility to provide durable solutions and 
protection for refugees and on the other hand there is a state´s desire to manage 
migration effectively and if possible, only admit skilled migrants and family 
immigrants.39F41 Therefore, as states generally try to regulate and control migration 
coming towards them, there is a well-founded fear that providing (orderly) 
resettlement places might be increasingly seen as a “quid pro quo” solution for 
admitting refugees, rather than having states deal with the unpredictability of arriving 
asylum-seekers at one´s doorstep. However, even if resettlement might be a viable 
solution for (smaller) states that would like to participate in burden-sharing, this 
shouldn’t become a substitution for scaling down the possibility of seeking asylum 
individually. Both are two parts of the umbrella of refugee protection: where 
resettlement is dependent on the “vagueness” of state policy, asylum should 
continue to be a right under international human rights law and be dependent only 
on Convention criteria.42 
As stated previously, the actual number of approx. refugees worldwide who might be 
involved in such a “managed migration” process stands at approx. 10%  of all refugees 
worldwide- much less than one might expect; therefore, resettlement is hardly a “one 
fits all” solution and rather tends to play a minor role in finding solutions for refugees.  
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Further, the warm welcome that asylum seekers and refugees in general have been 
granted during the 1990s and beforehand has been steadily declining – today´s 
attitude in most industrialized countries has gone cold, keeping acceptance numbers 
low. This also applies to resettlement places available, meaning that most likely the 
“halcyon days” of large-scale resettlements, as have been seen in the case of the 
Indochinese with about two million persons being accepted into third countries, will 
most likely not be repeated in the future.43 
However, as concerning developments in refugee situations in recent times, 
resettlement, even though very small compared to overall refugee numbers, can 
indeed prove to be of significant importance: especially in the case of long-standing 
refugee encampments that have been emerging since the 1990s. One apparent 
change since then is the duration of these situations: increasingly, refugee camps turn 
into now called Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS444), which see generations grow up 
in the same encampments. Indeed, over two thirds of today´s refugees worldwide 
find themselves not in an emergency situation but rather stuck in one of these 
protracted, ongoing camp environments, of which there are about 30 worldwide. 
Some of them, as can be expected, are the ones we see today in Thailand, 
compromised of Burmese refugees stuck in limbo in these camps.43F45 Many of these 
protracted camps throughout the world are closely connected to so called 
“failed/fragile states” which produce and maintain these situations. However, it is not 
only the continuing violence and absence of state protection for at least part of its 
citizens that can be seen as the source of PRS but moreover regional dynamics also 
help maintain these impasses.  As Loescher et al have pointed out: “They [PRS] 
endure because of ongoing problems in the countries of origin, and stagnate and 
become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving 
restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to 
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camps”. F46 Thus not only have host governments play a role in often maintaining 
protracted situations, but also “political impasses” of potential third countries may 
hinder any improvements  of such environments.   
Consequently, the option of third country resettlement is often regarded as one of 
the (only) options available for such cases, as Erika Feller, former UNHCR High 
Commissioner, noted in 2007:”While fewer than 1 percent of the world´s refugees 
may be resettled in any given year, resettlement is an important protection tool, a 
durable solution and a concrete manifestation of responsibility sharing.”47   
This viewpoint shows not only the role resettlement plays for refugees themselves in 
providing a secure new environment, but also argues that resettlement is an 
expression of burden, as well as responsibility sharing within the international 
community, and can thus be a way forward to “unlock” protracted refugee 
situations.46F48 Coming out of this understanding, resettlement as a means of refugee 
protection in situations where no other solution is feasible has high level priority in 
UNHCR goals; at the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR), issues 
thereof, as well as resettlement numbers and admission criteria are discussed among 
the main stakeholders consisting of states, NGOs, the IOM and UNHCR in order to 
improve resettlement as a protection tool for refugees. 47F49 Indeed, this official forum 
serves as the most important meeting arena for above actors and is used by UNHCR 
as an opportunity to try to increase commitments of receiving states to step up their 
intake numbers. The importance of this annual conference has been recognized by 
UNHCR itself, stating that one of the most important outcomes of the ATCR is actually 
the ATCR itself, showing that through its existence global partnerships and 
cooperation regarding resettlement is indeed promoted. :50 
However, the question of when resettlement is the best solution available continues 
to be debated: not only what counts as a “protracted situation” is subject to 
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discussion, but also which model to follow:  questions such as “How long does a 
refugee have to spend time in limbo (to make resettlement the best solution)?” or 
“What groups should be referred for group resettlement?” continue to be not clearly 
defined. 
2.1.1. Regarding US resettlement 
As stated previously, the US still stands as the most “generous” intaker of resettled 
refugees, far exceeding acceptance numbers of any other country. 
The events of 9/11 saw US immigration policies tighten significantly, especially in the 
months following the attacks; this meant not only increased security screenings and 
other control measures, but also had direct implications for to-be resettlement cases. 
In fact, the US resettlement program was the only US migration program to be 
completely brought to a halt following 9/11, with new arrivals through resettlement 
being less than 800 persons for the quarter of resettlement year October to 
December 2001, out of a projected 14,000 arrivals.51 
Fortunately, this proved to be only a temporary measure – admission numbers picked 
up quickly again, with a major boost from 28,000 intakes in FY 2002 and FY 2003, 
increasing to 53,000 persons in FY 2004; however, former US President Bush´s 
announcement aiming to increase intake numbers to 75,000 hasn’t been reached so 
far even under President Obama´s government. aimed at intake numbers of 75,000, 
this hasn’t yet been reached even under Mr. Obama`s government. 
Regarding admissions from the East Asian region, almost all of admissions are at 
present Burmese50F52 cases (Karen and Karenni ethnic group from six of the nine Thai 
refugee camps, ethnic Chin refugees from Malaysia), with some minor number of 
remaining Vietnamese being resettled through the former Orderly Departure 
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Program (ODP), which has been in place until 1994. Admission numbers for 2009 
were therefore standing at 19,000 persons, from which Burmese refugees accounted 
for 17,500 places.  For 2010, interviews were expanded for all of the nine camps 
along the Thai-Burmese border, leading to number of admissions of approx. 16,500 
Burmese. Regarding ceilings by region, East Asia therefore stands at second place, 
only overtaken by the Near East/South Asian region with a ceiling of 35,000 places for 
FY 2010.553  
As with all refugee admission countries, US policies and rules for acceptance vary case 
by case and country by country, and are subject to changes from time to time.  As 
such, I will only briefly outline the resettlement process of US referred resettlement 
cases from the specific case of Burmese refugees from a Thai refugee camp. Again, 
policies and guidelines for other admission countries or nationalities do vary. 
Firstly, getting recognized by UNHCR as a person deserving international protection is 
the primary prerequisite for applying for resettlement referral in any refugee case. In 
Thailand, however, being recognized by the government´s screening board 
(“Provisional Admission Board”, called PAB) comes even before UNHCR approval. Due 
to Thailand not having signed the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees of 
1949, as well as not having signed the Protocol of 1967, it is first and foremost at the 
Thai government´s discretion as to whom to admit as being a “refugee” on its 
territory. Therefore, even before UNHCR status, determination of the status of a 
person applying for refugee status has to be declared so by one of the local PABs.  
Subsequently, after receiving UNHCR refugee  status in one of the nine camps along 
the border, cases are transferred mostly by UNHCR to  one of the OPEs (“Overseas 
                                                      
53
 US Dpt. of State, Dpt. of Homeland Security and Dpt. of Health and Human Services Report 
2009:29ff. 
 Ceilings are, however, almost always not reached; moreover, since the beginning of the 1990s after 
the fall of the Soviet Union the gap between annual ceilings and actual acceptance numbers has 
continued to steadily widen into the new millennium and continues to do so (see Migration 
Information June 2004 http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=229). 
22 
 
 
Processing Entities”, now called “Resettlement Support Centers” RSCs), responsible 
for handling the screening and processing of resettlement cases.54  
OPE´s are mostly NGOs or other international bodies that collect biographic 
information about applicants, hold interviews and other screening procedures, refer 
cases and prepare cases for resettlement. In the case of US resettlement, they are 
overseen and funded by the US Department of State´s Bureau of Population, 
Refugees and Migration (PRM), which runs eight such RSCs around the world in 
cooperation with NGOs and other international organizations. The International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) is primarily responsible for US resettlement from Thailand. 
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3. Thailand´s first challenge: Indochina refugee influx  
 
The end of the Indochina war, with the fall of the US backed Saigon in 1975, marked 
the starting point of one of the largest resettlement interventions in history; not 
without reason the Indochina situation became one of the “loud emergencies”, as 
Vieira de Mello has pointed out. Media coverage was extensive, covering pictures of 
starving populations and desperate “boat people”. With remembrances on the 
Second World War still relatively fresh in mind, the generosity of the international 
community was accordingly wide – the Indochina crisis initiated a resettlement 
program which hasn’t been seen since then on a similar scale. Also, the amount of 
financial contributions to the UNHCR and governments of first asylum were people 
fled to were large-scale53F55 Out of all refugees who had been displaced from their 
respective countries, which amounted to approx. 3 million people, 2.5 Million were 
resettled worldwide with UNHCR assistance, the US being by far the largest taker with 
more than one million refugees54F.56 About 0,5 Million eventually returned to their 
country of origin. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the “emergency” was considered over – most camps in 
first asylum countries had been closed and most of the inhabitants resettled. 
Subsequently, the international community started redefining their resettlement 
policies and practices: mentioning “compassion fatigue” or “budgetary constraints”, 
some countries chose to decrease their resettlement quotas, others (re-)focused on 
only taking in specific (ethnic) groups or religious minorities – whichever the course 
chosen, it resulted in decreased resettlement slots available, especially for UNHCR 
referred cases, with most refugees being taken in through family reunification 
programs.  
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For UNHCR, this had negative consequences: under its protection mandate, 
resettlement is seen as an essential solution; decreasing slots were therefore 
endangering its capacity to provide such protection. Especially in situations where 
other solutions, e.g. repatriation, weren’t feasible, this scaling back was a major 
challenge which hasn’t yet become easier until today. Increasingly, an opinion that 
seemed to gain dominance was that there was something like a “solution hierarchy”, 
with repatriation being the “happiest” durable solution and resettlement as the “least 
desirable”. This notion can be seen even today among (host) governments, donors 
and other stakeholders. Ranging solutions is clearly the wrong way of handling 
refugee situations– which approach is the most durable, and the most beneficial to 
particular refugees is subject to various factors and therefore cannot be a “one fits 
all” attempt. However, when talking about the “best, most durable solution for a 
certain refugee situation”, the question remains, as Fredriksson has pointed out, as in 
whose eyes this might be the most beneficial.57  
 
3.1. The case of the Laos Hmong  
The plight of the Hmong refugee group has been well followed as part of the general 
Indochina refugee movement; together with hundreds of Cambodian Khmer and 
Vietnamese, they have been accommodated for years in crowded camps along the 
northern Thai border.  
However, when looking at the history of this particular group, it becomes evident that 
they have been one of the “big losers” of US cooperation during the war – for 
knowing the terrain and being of strategic importance, the ethnic Hmong hill tribes 
had been recruited, trained and supported by the US army throughout their 
campaigns in Southeast Asia. However, after the end of the war, they came to be 
known as America´s “forgotten allies”,  being left behind to fend for themselves, 
being outcasts in their own country and essentially being seen as enemies of the 
communist Prathet Lao  government, which didn’t favor their past involvement with 
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the US after their takeover in 1975. F58  As a result, as many as 10% of the whole 
population fled to Thailand from persecution and discrimination, ending in refugee 
camps established along the Thai/Lao border. In fact, already in 1976, their number 
had swollen to approx. 325,000.59 Even though the ethnic composition, especially 
along the border regions between Thailand and Laos is very similar to Thailand`s 
northern population, the Thai government was wary of local integration of refugees. 
This policy has not changed since then, which will be elaborated further on. As a 
result, the Hmong were given the opportunity to resettle predominantly to the US, 
starting at the end of 1975. By the end of 2001, almost all Hmong refugees, approx. 
200,000 in total, had been moved to the United States. Additionally, smaller numbers 
were resettled to Australia, Canada, French Guyana, France and Germany.60   
It is noteworthy that very recently until December 2010, one last group of Hmong 
refugees was still holding out at a temple in central Thailand. This last remaining 
group refused to return to Laos for fear of being persecuted by the government 
connected to the above mentioned involvement with the US army back in the 1970s. 
The Thai government however refused to recognize them as refugees, even though 
they were indeed declared as such by UNHCR. Although most of this remaining 
population moved to the US eventually, the remaining part of approx. 4,500 persons 
who could or would not resettle to the US were forcefully repatriated to Laos in 2010, 
despite protests by UNHCR and various governments, which brought the  number of 
turned back Hmong to around 7,500 by the end of 2010. 
Although most of the remaining Hmong were moving to the United States eventually, 
reasons for being so reluctant to resettle until 2010, as Fink DeVivo has pointed out, 
were closely connected to insecurities about moving to a completely now location. 
                                                      
58
 See e.g. Benjamin Zanicki´s work on this issue, who has been continuing to lobby for the remaining 
Hmong to be resettled to the US (Forced Migration Review No. 28,2007); Zanicki was also one of the 
very few who managed to provided the outside world with a rare insight account of “life on the run” 
inside Laos: Time´s article “Insight the Jungle” by  Andrew Perrin. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,447253,00.html  
59
 IDMC 2010:5; Fink De Vivo 2005:7f; Radio Free Asia 2010:2 
60
 On Hmong families in Gammertingen, Germany see Tou T. Yang (2003): ”Hmong of Germany: 
Preliminary Report on the Resettlement of Lao Hmong Refugees in Germany”, in: Hmong Studies 
Journal  2003, 4:1-14. On  Hmong resettled in French Guyana see Patrick F. Clarkin (2005): “Hmong 
Resettlement in French Guiana”, in: Hmong Studies Journal 2005, 6: 1-27. 
26 
 
 
“Rumors” were circulating among the border camp population, about American 
doctors hurting patients and eating livers and of violent gangs on American streets; 
this clearly reflected refugees´ fears about moving to an unknown new location; 
additionally, stories such as not being able to sacrifice animals in America showed 
worries and fears about how to sustain one´s own traditions and customs in such a 
completely new environment. Interestingly, however, refugees were also worried 
about being imprisoned without due process and foundation, which is something that 
Tham Hin refugees, as will be discussed further below, do not worry about too much: 
the process and the judicial system are seen as positives about resettlement, namely 
being safe from arbitrary arrest and assaults by officials.61 
As for this remaining part of refugees, estimated to be around 15,000 persons, they 
chose to stay behind and eventually by mid  1990 had moved to the abovementioned 
temple Wat Thamkrabok, a monastery in Saraburi province about 70 km from 
Bangkok. Under the then charismatic Abbot Chamroon Parnchand, gradually a 
settlement evolved which, due to not being an official refugee camp, resembled more 
a Hmong village rather than a camp. Residents were free to leave or enter the camp 
as there was no registration system; also, employment was there for the work-willing, 
which resulted soon in different standards of living due to different engagement and 
skills levels.61F62 However there was no assistance or services whatsoever provided by 
authorities or any other organization. Not only to increase one´s own living standard, 
but also because there was no assistance, people in Wat Thamkrabok had to work in 
order to buy food and other necessities, which is quite a different situation than what 
we see today in Burmese refugee camps in Thailand.  
With the Abbot´s death in 2003, the situation changed significantly – the Thai 
government viewed the settlement situation suspiciously, with allegations of the Wat 
being a “hot spot” for illegal activities, including drug trafficking. Warnings were being 
issued to UNHCR and the US government that repatriation of the remaining Hmong 
was being considered. Also in 2004, the government sent in “Taskforce 546”, named 
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after the number of its members, in order to stabilize and “clean up” the situation. As 
a result, the settlement was fenced in and strict regulations regarding movements in 
and out and freedoms regarding work were imposed. Subsequently, the Wat 
resembled more a typical refugee camp than the previously naturally grown village. 
Additionally, living standards inside the compound deteriorated, making at least part 
of the inhabitants more dependent on relatives outside the Wat.  
However when elections were coming close, the Royal Thai government was looking 
for a more durable solution. After consulting with the UNHCR in 2003, eventually it 
was agreed that this last group of Hmong would be admitted under a family 
reunification scheme to the US. Registrations by the Thai authorities were initiated 
inside the Wat, with the prerequisite that only those who could prove to have been 
living inside the compound before August 2003 would be registered (and 
subsequently become eligible for resettlement). Between April and August 2003, this 
led to a registration of 1740 families (approx. 15,000 individuals).63 
 With this prerequisite, the government was trying to prevent resettlement being a 
“magnet” for new arrivals, as well as to try to separate “real” refugees from economic 
migrants. However, as is the case with Burmese refugee camps now, this system had 
the negative effect that it prevented an unknown number of individuals to resettle 
altogether, due to various factors. This has also been pointed out by Refugees 
International, which has argued that the registration policy is problematic due to its 
strict rules and criteria: foremost among these being the father/husband is taken as 
the “principle applicant of the household”, meaning that even if the other family 
members are willing to resettle, they might not be able to. 63F64 As has also been 
pointed out by McLean, Hmong women in the camps access information and express 
opinion solely through a male counterpart, e.g. husband or father, other formal 
channels are rarely accessible.65  
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A short excursion on Hmong social structures 
Hmong culture is based on marriage, which serves as the bond to form social, 
economical and political ties between families. The society is patriarchic as well as 
patrilineal, with men sometimes having several wives and, accordingly, a rather high 
number of children.66 As anthropologist Jo Ann Koltyk has pointed out, “Marriage is 
the creative principle which links clans and individuals.  To the Hmong, marriage 
means having a family and also having good relationships with other clans.”  F67 Kinship 
ties are seen as the essential bond in Hmong society. “Household” also includes the 
children´s wives/husbands and their children, significantly widening who is part of the 
family. Filial duty and piety is expected from children, but also vice versa from the 
parents` side. Moreover, this understanding of loyalty and duty is not just limited to 
one´s own family, but rather entails the whole of one´s own clan67F68, and to a wider 
extent, the whole Hmong society. Clearly defined duties and obligations are tied to an 
individual´s position in society, which follows a strict and relatively easy to follow 
lineage system. Kinship is the very basic fabric of Hmong society; it is seen as a mutual 
obligation of solidarity and respect to family, the clan and society at large. This makes 
it possible to rely on one another for help and support, which lasts for life.  
This interdependence likewise shows itself in everyday Hmong life, which is 
predominantly agricultural – farming and harvesting is done collectively, as are 
almost all other spheres of Hmong life, be it consumption of the products or also 
spiritual rituals etc. Therefore, even if there were something like a clearly marked 
“core family” in Hmong society, they would hardly be able to survive independently in 
the community.69  
Taking this build-up of Hmong society into consideration, it is hardly surprising that 
prospects of having to split families due to registration issues was the cause of a 
relatively large number of problems during the resettlement process at Wat 
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Thamkrabok. This has been pointed out by Refugees International in 2004, who noted 
that the extended family bonds should be taken into account in the process of 
registration by Thai authorities and when compiling resettlement lists. For example, 
the organization identified cases where married children were not on the list for 
resettlement but their (elderly) parents were, making it very likely that the parents 
themselves wouldn’t resettle. Also, there were cases of individuals missing the 
registration date due to accidents, not being present in the camp on that day etc., 
which subsequently resulted in not being put on the resettlement list even though 
eligible. Refugee International has pointed out that there ought to be the possibility 
of “rethinking” one´s decision in cases where individuals or families first opt against 
resettlement and then change their mind on a later stage.69F70 
As the whole process of registration and selection by Thai authorities was set up 
rather intransparently, not much information was distributed among the Wat´s 
population. Consequently, when Thai registration teams arrived, this was understood 
by some of the Hmong as a pretext by the government to repatriate them – as a 
result, many fled the Wat, going into hiding elsewhere throughout the country71. The 
rest of the Hmong, which was the larger part, finally left for the US starting in July 
2004, with the “camp” being finally closed down by 2005.72  
In retrospective, the resettlement program at Wat Thamkrabok was seen as a rather 
“well-managed” and uniquely “quick” program, with the remaining refugees at the 
Wat joining to 98% already resettled family members in the United States and the 
whole process being decided and completed between 2003 and 2005. By effectively 
controlling entries and exits of the Wat, the Thai government, in cooperation with 
UNHCR and other actors, successfully managed to control the “pull factor” which the 
announced resettlement program inevitably created. Consequently, it is still hoped 
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that this could be taken as a positive example of how resettlement can indeed be 
successful for the Burmese refugee situation today.72F73  
The international and domestic political climate in Thailand has changed in recent 
years in some respects. Moreover, the background situation of the Hmong and the 
Burmese refugees does differ in some points. However, as there can indeed be seen 
similarities, it makes sense to draw up a comparison of the situation at Wat 
Thamkrabok and the current situation of Burmese refugees, represented by the case 
study of Tham Hin camp.  
First of all, the concept of extended family networks is nothing particular to only 
Hmong society, but can also be seen in Karen and Karenni society –“families” are 
extensive, compromising often more than 10 individuals. Also there are strong 
expectations of filial duty and loyalty towards parents, meaning that decisions by 
parents are regarded as superior to children´s decisions, even if the children already 
have families of their own.  The same problems that became apparent due to the 
admissions criteria during the Hmong resettlement program can be found with the 
resettlement process in Tham Hin: eligibility dependent on a cut-off date is a major 
problem for refugees in the current camps as well. Even worse, as has been outlined 
previously, the Thai government´s, at times, inconsistent and opaque policy of 
registrations has resulted in separation of refugees into groups that can be labeled as 
“not registered at all”, “semi-registered” and “registered”, which in return does cause 
stress on families expected to make a resettlement decision. 
Whereas younger Hmong were concerned about not being able to follow in 
education or not being able to be admitted to the US at all, the prospect of having to 
split families was a source of considerable stress and anxiety, primarily among the 
elder population. Taking into consideration the very strong kinship and family 
network bonds, parents were quite significantly worried about adult children being 
left behind due to registration issues.  
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Again in Tham Hin, we can see these same issues arising out of the registration 
process, as well as the process of resettlement; as pointed out, the importance of 
family and kinship is relatively strong in both situations, meaning that the same 
worries and problems in Tham Hin persist today as they have been in Wat 
Thamkrabok in regard to possible splits in families. 
However, the general custom in Karen society as can be seen in Tham Hin is 
monogamy, meaning that it is not common to be married to more than one wife. 
Therefore, this at least leaves out the problem of adapting to American society where 
polygamy is illegal, which at times was indeed a problem in the Hmong resettlement 
operation. 
Also, fears and worries about resettlement in Wat Thamkrabok resemble thoughts of 
Burmese refugees today – how to be able to cope in a new environment, how to keep 
up with education and language acquisition etc. seem to have been major concerns 
among the Hmong as well as again with the Burmese today. However, as has been 
pointed out previously, while the Hmong were rather worried about officials overseas 
and of not being treated according to the law in their new country, answers in Tham 
Hin were often the opposite, citing being able to rely on the law and its officials as a 
major benefit of resettlement. This divergence might most likely be due to different 
past experiences of the two groups – when having a look at how the Burmese regime 
treats its citizens, it is not much surprising that trust in the system and domestic laws 
has become rather weak. Compared to this, the Hmong experience with 
maltreatment by its own officials of course occurred as well and was the basis of 
flight, but compared to Burma was in most cases of less constant, systematic nature 
than compared to the situation in Burma.  
Information about what to expect of their prospective 3rd country was rather scarce 
in the Wat, even though a large number of residents already had some form of ties to 
already resettled persons overseas. On the other hand in the Burmese camps today 
refugees seem to be generally well informed about what to expect in which third 
country; however, (negative) rumors do spread as well, at times painting a wrong 
picture of third country conditions.  
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The situation in Wat Thamkrabok prior to the taking over of Taskforce 546 in 2004 
was much more relaxed and village-like than what we see today in the Burmese 
camps along the border. Living standards at the Wat were significantly higher, 
freedom of movement and work allowance was no major problem. Even though 
there was no assistance or services provided by NGOs or the Thai government, the 
compound functioned rather well and was self-sufficient. Answers given by 
interviewees during research done by Grigoleit in 2004 explained that residents were 
expected to work in order to improve their lives and to foster commerce in the 
community. With no free assistance available, residents were completely dependent 
on their own motivations and willingness to work. As compared with the Burmese 
camps we see today, which are almost completely dependent on outside aid,  the 
prevailing mood in the Hmong “village camp”  was therefore different, which in 
return likely had an influence on the decision to leave the camp for overseas or not.74  
Finally, the question lingers as to why the Hmong operations went so well, whereas 
the Burmese resettlement program is moving very slow and has many obstacles. 
Moreover, since the family and community build-up in Hmong and Burmese culture is 
quite similar, it is not so far an assumption that both cases should have gone 
relatively smoothly. 
An answer to this question cannot avoid looking at the different political situations 
locally, as well as on the international level. Namely, the circumstance that the 
Hmong fighters had been of vital support to the US in their combat operations in Laos 
during the war put them in a unique position afterwards as “reliable friends of the 
US”. This, in return, was then taken up by the latter to create a rather big “hype” 
around the issue, effectively proclaiming that “America will come and rescue its 
former allies”. Subsequently the resettlement operations that followed were large 
and well-funded, as were the reception facilities and other assistance mechanisms in 
the US. In return, the Hmong communities that became established through these 
systems helped significantly to facilitate the resettlement and integration of other 
Hmong who came afterwards. 
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In contrast, the situation of the Burmese refugees today is different: There is no 
similar “former support story” for the US as the Hmong had,  and consequently there 
is less interest and less willingness on the US side for an efficient, quick resettlement 
and a durable solution to the Burmese refugee situation in Thailand. Additionally, the 
international and regional political circumstances are not the same: the Cold War has 
long ended, and the propaganda to “save former allies from communism” doesn’t 
work anymore as it did before. Apart from this, the relationship with the Burmese 
regime cannot be left out of the picture: any action by either the Thai government 
regarding the camps or other countries involved in the Burmese refugee situation is 
likely to have economical, political and/or security consequences.   
Lastly, there is little hope that the situation in Burma will significantly improve in the 
near future, therefore concerns about the resettlement program to become a 
“magnet” for more arrivals is justified to some extent. It is also unlikely, due to the 
ongoing situation in Burma, that even any such program would put an end to the 
source of refugee influxes into Thailand.  
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4. Refugees´ position in Thailand  
4.1. The Royal Thai Government´s policies  
Thailand is a Buddhist country of approx. 67 Million inhabitants, lying amongst 
regions that have been shaken by violent upheavals and turmoil for decades. Due to 
geographic, economic and political reasons, Thailand has been put in a role of 
“reluctant host” to thousands of refugees and migrants from these regions for the 
past three decades.  
One of the major crises for which Thailand played host to refugees was the Indochina 
War, which saw about one million if not more refugees from neighboring Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia pour into the northern border regions of Thailand, which was a 
huge challenge to cope with by the Thai government. Even though this situation was 
rather well managed, with assistance by the international community consisting of 
large-scale resettlement programs, the thousands of Burmese refugees on Thai soil 
today prove to be an even greater challenge to deal with, with currently still no end 
solution in sight.75 
Thailand is neither a member to the Geneva Convention, nor the 1967 Protocol, and 
there exists no legal basis to handle asylum-seekers in Thai national law. 
Consequently, denotations of refugee-related issues are a sensible issue in the 
country. Terms being used since 1990 such as “temporary shelters” (instead of 
“refugee camps”), or “temporarily displaced persons” (instead of “refugees”) clearly 
show the government´s desire to point out the temporary nature of this situation, 
regardless of the fact that it has been persistent for almost thirty years.75F76 The policy 
in practice is to “accept and assist displaced persons on a humanitarian basis”-  in 
theory, this means no repatriations until the situation in Burma has improved and 
allows for such, but at the same time, discourages local integration. The 
government´s unwillingness for any measures which would point towards integrating 
these people eventually, as well as lack of concern regarding such influxes can be 
seen on a policy statement: “… the intake of displaced persons has entailed huge 
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cost[s] for Thailand in terms of administration and personnel, environmental 
degradation, deforestation, and epidemic control and the displacement affected Thai 
villages as well as the psychological impact on the local population”. 76F
77 
Even though UNHCR has been permitted to operate in Thailand from 1997 onwards, 
being recognized as a refugee according to the Geneva Convention does not mean 
security in Thailand. First, the government has to recognize an individual through its 
national screening process which is administered through so called “Provincial 
Admission Boards” (PABs), and only then can the UNHCR issue a subsequent 
recognition. As will be shown below, anything before PAB recognition is no assurance 
from detention or deportation. This shows, again, UNHCR´s rather inferior role 
against national policies, by respecting a country´s refugee handling before its own.77F78  
As of March 2011, the Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), which is the umbrella 
organization for managing the border camps, reported about 140,00078F79 persons living 
in one of the nine camps along the border, of which approx. 83,000 are recognized by 
UNHCR and the Royal Thai government.79F80 However, actual numbers vary widely 
across publications and years, ranging from approx. 100,000 to 150,000 persons living 
in camps between 2008 and 2011. This is also due to fluctuations in entries and exits, 
which are rather frequent. Also, as fighting continues across the border in Burma, so 
do new arrivals in the camps. Therefore, together with births and deaths, the number 
of camp residents hasn’t gone down, even after the start of the resettlement 
programs. Another estimated 300,000 potential refugees live clandestinely in the rest 
of the country, mingling with another 1,5 to 2 Million economic migrants from 
Burma.80F81 The distinction between these two groups remains blurred, which makes 
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not only the work of UNHCR more difficult, but also poses a major challenges and 
problems for the Thai government. 81F82 The Royal Thai Government (RTG) only 
recognizes as “refugees” persons living inside one of the camps along the border. 
Everybody found outside, be it holding a form of recognition or not, is subject to 
arrest and detention as well as deportation82F83 
RSD processes (Refugee Status Determination) were generally conducted for all 
asylum-seekers in Bangkok, irrespective of nationality. However, in order to gain 
greater control over the RSD process and in order to maintain better oversight of the 
Burmese population in Thailand, this was halted by the Thai government in 2004. 
Subsequently, from November 2005 onward, status determination has been required 
to be done at the border, with all Burmese asylum-seekers being transferred from 
Bangkok to one of the nine camps.83F84  
PAB national screening processes for asylum-seekers have been initiated already 
since 1999, but have been largely dysfunctional due to fears of being a “magnet” 
which could lead to ever more new arrivals.  
Leading up to the closure of status determination procedures by UNHCR, Burmese 
asylum-seekers arriving after January 2004 could only register with UNHCR and 
obtain a slip, leading to about 10,887 persons being referred to as “slip-holders”. 
After frequent interruptions of the PABs, another round of PAB registration took 
place in September 2006, during which more than 2000 “slip-holders” were 
transferred to camps in Tak Province and were subsequently finally recognized by 
PAB which included receiving a registration number which is the precondition for 
resettlement eligibility. Others, however, still remain in limbo. Subsequently in 
September 2007, as a result of the protests in Rangoon, UNHCR was allowed to 
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conduct a new round of registrations, leading to a new batch of “slip-holders” –  
however, as the PABs haven’t resumed their activities especially in the southern 
camps since then, a significant backlog of these “slip-holders” has been created. 
Again in 2009, after urging by NGOs and UNHCR, a pilot pre-screening exercise in 
order to “screen-out those without a manifestly just claim for asylum” was being 
initiated in four of the nine camps along the border, with a resulting 11,000 
individuals` cases sent to the National Security Council for approval. However, results 
varied widely, with acceptance numbers in the northern camps being about 90%, 
whereas in the southern camps (incl. Tham Hin), only approx. 3% were accepted.85 At 
the time of writing, there have been no follow-up actions by the Thai government and 
it is unclear how the work of the PABs will continue. Further, registration done by 
UNHCR is only proof of being registered in their asylum-claim/having come forward 
to UNHCR with one´s claim, and merely serves to ask the government not to deport 
such individuals concerned. Therefore, “slip-holders” as well aren’t safe from arrest 
or deportation and subsequently remain in a state of limbo, essentially being only 
“one step” above those not registered at all.84F86  Summing up, since the halt of status 
determination procedures in Bangkok, the situation has become even more unstable 
and intransparent, further complicated by the infrequent PAB screenings which have 
resulted in a “mix” of persons of different status in the camps, depending on these 
screenings. As will be discussed further below, the PAB registration plays an essential 
part in resettlement. 
One way of explaining the stance of the government for being rather unwilling to 
conduct any regular screenings is the fear of attracting even larger numbers of new 
arrivals from across the border. Indeed, as has been stated above, numbers of camp 
residents haven’t gone down as much as expected since the commencement of the 
resettlement program in 2004, making the government even more careful with 
(in)actions on the current situation. Finally, the volatile political climate in Thailand 
itself has not been helpful to the situation regarding the camps, or refugees in 
Thailand in general; protests and turmoil in recent years have put the issue down the 
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government´s agenda and, additionally, a worsening of the attitude towards refugees 
has been detected, resulting in increased deportations and a harder stance on the 
issue in negotiations with stakeholders.85F87 
 
 
 
4.2. An historical overview on Burmese developments   
Thailand shares a porous string of approx. 2.400 km with its neighbor Burma, which, 
due to being hard to guard terrain, has always made it easy for crossings. This has 
sometimes resulted in trickles, sometimes in something more resembling a “stream” 
of Burmese fleeing across the border.  
However, compared to the other major refugee crisis with which Thailand has been 
confronted, namely the influx of thousands of Khmer, Hmong and Vietnamese 
through the Indochine war, the situation of Burmese refugees has rather been a long-
lasting and evolving one, enduring since the mid 1980s. Looking at the initial camps, 
or rather settlements in the 1980s, one can see that this situation has become 
increasingly more severe, tighter, and protracted over the years since its 
commencement, with up to now still no solution in sight. Quite naturally, as would be 
everywhere the case, out of a temporary ad hoc situation with few refugees who 
needed little assistance due to lack of improvement of conditions in Burma, the 
situation has become worse and worse, resembling, if one will, something like a 
“clogged bathtub”, with ever more water damming the drain and a continuously 
running tab.  
The primary reason for the flight of thousands of Burmese across the borders is for a 
large part connected to the variety of ethnic divisions in the country: right after 
independence in 1948, the country was released from Britain with a challenge very 
hard to come by, namely how to unify all the different groupings under one 
administration, in one territorial state. This was something quite different from the 
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colonial past, and would have been a major challenge for any post-independent 
country in the world.  
Therefore, almost immediately after 1948, ethnic conflicts erupted, of which some 
still drag on today. Even though the first Burmese government, the then Anti-Fascist 
People´s Freedom League (AFPFL) focused on a post-independence constitution that 
was designed after a federal model, with provisions to include various minority 
groups in the government and to allow some degree of autonomy for the different 
ethnic groups in their respective districts. The challenge was seen indeed: How to 
include all those several, quite different groups which had previously been separated 
under one administrative system while at the same time keep some degree of 
autonomy for each of them. Even the possibility of an eventual secession was 
discussed, which would have been an option after ten years time.86F88 However, even 
though this initial form of autonomy was afforded, effective control remained with 
the central government in Rangoon.87F89  
With the failure of Rangoon to cope with this mix of ethnic divisions, various ethnic 
insurgent units, para-military groupings and other more or less legal fractions 
continued fighting against each other and/or the government. “Official” accounts 
note that by 1949, approx. 75% of all towns and villages had fallen to one or the other 
insurgent group. Around 1950, however, the AFPFL government managed to at least 
gain back some form of control and stability under then President U Nu.88F90  
 Partly this was also attributed to the establishment and training of the tatmadaw, 
the government´s army, which developed out of a disorganized, rather mercenary-
like group of soldiers into “dependable custodians of the Union”89F91, and are still one of 
the major player in today´s conflict. However, quasi democratic rule ended finally in 
1962, with a coup putting the military under the control of General Ne Win. 
Federalism, at least the flawed form of it that had been established since 
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independence, hadn’t proven to solve the challenge to unify the country in order to 
move ahead.92 
In the decades to follow, war between the tatmadaw, representing the central 
government, and various ethnic insurgent groups continued. Although the 
government supported and supplied its military troops, they were often clearly in an 
inferior position against their opponents. Namely, several insurgent groups had found 
out the benefits of opening illegal trade points with neighboring Thailand, charging 
taxes, and then using the money for better equipment, arms and other supplies. They 
were also often clearly in an advantaged position through their knowledge of the 
local jungle terrain and by being supported, at least whenever possible, by the local 
population.  
In 1997 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was dissolved, with 
several of its key figures being purged. However, even after the re-naming into the 
“State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC), major figures of the past continued 
to dominate the political stage. Thus the four original strongmen, Sr. General Than 
Shwe as the most prominent one, Gen. Maung Aye, Ltn. Khin Nyunt as well as Ltn. 
Gen. Tin Oo continue to hold the reins of power in the country.  
In the years following and up through today, ethnic groups are continuing to fight 
against the tatmadaw mostly for political autonomy: the aim of the government to 
unify all the different ethnic groups under “one Burma” is still today the major point 
of distress between the sides. Moreover, the ongoing civil war has widened the gap 
between the government and its opponents, making reconciliation with every year of 
fighting more difficult. For the regime, the insurgents are seen as obstacles to 
national unity, whereas the ethnic groups see Rangoon as trying to extinguish them.  
With the walls drawn up on both sides, attempts for ceasefires have generally not 
been sustainable, with violence erupting again on both sides, especially along the 
border regions, including the one to Thailand. 
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4.2.1. Camp establishments and developments since the 1990s 
However inferior the position of the military troops seemed to be generally, the 
beginning of the 1990s saw the  situation begin to turn: the tatmadaw were able to 
gain ground and hold territory, even through the rainy season, which had previously 
always seen them retreating to their original safe positions. This success is due to 
various reasons, of which ne clearly is the cutting of the local civilian support lines for 
the rebels, which was one of the “Four Cuts” measures of the army.91F93 Through their 
prolonged attacks on the local civilian support bases which became eroded, they 
succeeded in establishing themselves firmly along the border opposite Thailand, 
eliminating the majority of the bases of the ethnic insurgent’s groups. This military 
take-up subsequently drove more and more refugees across the border, whose 
numbers steadily increased to more than 90,000 persons by 1995.92F94 Hence eventually 
the military´s strategy proved to be working: civilian support was increasingly eroded. 
Up to today this strategy is pursued, which is still one of the main reasons for 
continuing displacements inside Burma. 
Even prior to the military´s successes, the democracy uprisings in 1988 and the chaos 
that succeeded the refusal of the regime to acknowledge the victory of the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) in 1990 were catalysts for major refugee flows across 
the border. Ethnic Mon, Shan, Karen93F95 and Karenni ethnic groups were especially 
affected by the violence, and subsequently became the major groups in the camps.  
 The first semi-permanent camps which had been established in Thailand by the 
Karen ethnic group date back to 1984, when the Burmese military launched an up-to-
then unseen attack on the Karen National Union´s (KNU) frontline opposite the 
border with Thailand at Manerplaw, sending about 10,000 refugees into Thailand. 
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Without the opportunity to go back after the military had established themselves on 
the gained territory, these first camps were established. 94F96 
 Prior to the successes of the Burmese military around 1990, refugee numbers were 
rather low and dynamic, always depending on the developments in Burma and the 
losses or gains of the ethnic insurgents against the tatmadaw. Especially the annual 
dry seasons were used frequently by the military to advance further and to launch 
new attacks, which subsequently resulted in the stream of refugees fleeing across the 
border swelling.  
Camp structures in the first 15 years of existence resembled more “village-like” 
structures largely being unattended by the Thai government except for providing 
security, compromising relatively open, spread out areas.  Camp management was 
run by appointed camp committees, with different departments for education, health 
and others sectors being similarly organized as they had been in Burma.  The camps 
were quite cost-effective and self-sufficient establishments, with only very few 
international and some local NGOs95F97 providing basic assistance in terms of food, 
equipment and other basic goods. Community networks acted as the “fabric” through 
which justice, social welfare and other services could be built on communal trust and 
neighborhood.  Essentially, as Sally Thompson has pointed out , “the refugees used 
the system they had brought with them”.9698 In fact, Tham Hin camp, which is the focus 
of this paper, was one of the first of these establishments and – regrettably – still 
stands today. This rather tolerating approach from the Thai government´s side shows 
that nobody was projecting that this refugee exodus would become so prolonged; the 
general expectation of all stakeholders involved was that as soon as the situation in 
Burma would improve, these persons would return home voluntarily. Indeed, “if 
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change would have come in Burma, refugees would have been able to return 
relatively unaffected by their stay in Thailand.”97F99 
Apart from being rather openly spread out camps, the Thai military covertly 
supported the KNU and the KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) and allowed 
them to administrate these “liberated zones” along to border to serve as a buffer 
between the Burmese army and Thailand. Even more, close links existed (and 
sometimes even exist today) between the civilian camp population and ethnic rebel 
groups: camps act(ed) as a supply line for food, medical help as well as personnel 
supplies and, especially during the 1990s, provided a “safe haven” for rebels. 
With the fall of the KNU and KNPP insurgent bases along the border by 1997, it was 
no longer possible to uphold a buffer zone between the two sides, meaning that the 
Thai government gradually withdrew its military protection as well, opting instead for 
more “constructive engagement” with the regime; this included communications 
through trade and economic links. This path was also sought after by ASEAN, of which 
Burma became a member in 1997.98F100 
The Burmese military subsequently launched massive village relocations along the 
border, aimed at bringing the population under military control and to finally 
eliminate all ethnic resistance.99 This caused an even larger number of potential 
refugees to flee to Thailand as well, numbering around 300,000 by 2007. However, 
numbers of this group are harder to pin down than for actual camp residents´ 
numbers, given the chaos inside the country and unknown population figures. Also 
important to note, as has been stated previously, the difference between Burmese 
refugees and economic migrants is highly blurred, making any counting of whichever 
group almost impossible to be precise.  
The previous 25 camps along the border were consolidated into nine larger ones; 
mostly this was proclaimed to be for security reasons, with the former small, informal 
settlements being difficult to defend. Especially with several attacks from the 
tatmadaw on the camps, this came to be an especially convincing argument. As Black 
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has pointed out, such measures by the Thai government to consolidate the existing 
camps into bigger ones were rather understandable. He argues that in most similar 
situations, specific reasons or events are taken as pretext to “finally” consolidate such 
settlements into better controllable ones. He  makes a point in arguing that “[n]o 
government will be happy with the dispersed settlement of refugees in a border area 
if it makes that area vulnerable to attack by parties to the conflict” – which is exactly 
what the situation was in Thailand.100F101 
However, in terms of improved security, this measure had a disastrous effect on the 
livelihood of camp residents: fences were erected, restricting any movement 
between the camps and working in the local vicinity was restricted and then 
forbidden by Thai law. The settlements essentially became fortified camps, with the 
Thai military as guards. As a result, camp residents have become almost entirely 
dependent on outside aid. Consequently, the number of local and international NGOs 
and other organizations has gone up significantly. Telling is the invitation of the 
UNHCR by the Thai government in 1997 – the establishment of the UN was, in a way, 
marking the final cut to self-sufficiency and autonomy for the camps.  
The camps themselves, by their very nature of being “bubbles” fed by outside aid, are 
obstacles in many spheres; their tolerance on Thai soil are a constant thorn in the eye 
of the Rangoon regime, especially as it is an open secret that they are still used as 
recovering bases and supply centers for ethnic insurgents. This is straining the 
tolerance of the Thai government, which is also worried about the burgeoning drugs 
and arms trade across the border.101F102  
Also, refugees are prone to become “scapegoats” for various issues arising in these 
already relatively hinterland regions along the border – there have been complaints 
by local Thai populations of drains on local resources and environmental damages on 
streams, land and the woods are evident. On the other hand, Thai villages do benefit 
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from the cheap labor of camp residents, who sneak out regularly to work at local 
plantations and fields.102F103  
The situation in the camps itself is rather dire as expected – huts are constructed out 
of wood with bamboo thatches, there is little space in between and not much open 
area for activities etc.103F104 The encampments are not connected to public services such 
as waste disposal, running water or electricity. Also, due to their remote locations, 
most of the camps are not connected to the Internet and mobile phone signals are 
scarce and unreliable. Fresh water comes out of local streams, which are connected 
to pipes being turned on several times a day. Trash is collected from time to time and 
then burned collectively outside the camp. 
As mentioned earlier, Thailand does not allow for local integration. With voluntary 
repatriation neither being an option now or in the near future, 3rd country 
resettlement has come to be seen the most durable, realistic solution for Burmese 
refugees in Thailand. 
On the Thai government´s side there was and still is growing concern about the 
continuing protracted situation on its borders; with improvements in Burma not very 
likely in the near future, Bangkok started thinking of other ways to improve the 
situation in the nine camps along the border. This was further pushed by a joint letter 
in 2005 by UNHCR and involved NGOs to the government, which again outlined the 
dire situation in the camps—which hadn’t seen any improvements over many years 
and which called for necessary changes to be made. Following this initiative, there 
were slow changes in the government´s stance towards the situation – foremost, in 
an attempt to finally improve the livelihood conditions of residents, pilot projects 
were started, including various vocational training courses and agricultural projects in 
the vicinity of the camps. Also, in 2007, the government made a move to issue about 
85,000 identity cards to camp residents, which was a significant step towards 
improving self-sufficiency of refugees. Since then, various educational and vocational 
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training programs are held in all of the nine camps, which have proven to be very 
popular especially among the younger generations. The ulterior motive of these 
programs is to try to equip refugees with a certain amount of skills which would be 
useful after third country resettlement.   
By far the most significant steps in the attempt to bring some positive changes into 
this protracted situation was the agreement to launch a major resettlement 
operation. This was firstly agreed on in 2004 by the US to resettle Burmese refugees 
from Thailand. Subsequently, the first camp to be targeted for this was Tham Hin, 
being one of the oldest and most crowded camps. After having changed its legal 
requirements104F105, resettlement operations to the US eventually began in late 2005. 
The US resettlement has been set to be on a group basis, meaning that the whole 
camp (PAB registered persons) is submitted for US resettlement, rather than 
individuals only. This was followed by Australia and Canada at a later stage, even 
though these countries tend to accept rather special cases such as urgent medical 
needs or women at risk (e.g. cases of sexual violence, single mothers, etc.). Other 
countries, mostly from Europe such as Finland or Norway, usually rely on 
“resettlement missions” led by some of the country´s representatives to hand pick a 
rather small number of mostly urgent cases to be transferred. Missions such as these 
are rather infrequent; for example there were only two such resettlement country 
missions (Australia and Finland) in 2009 for Tham Hin camp.106 Since resettlement 
operations started in 2005, the number of referred individuals has surpassed the 
50,000 mark in 2009, and has increased to more than 60,000 refugees at the time of 
writing, each departing to various third countries, foremost to the US.  
Considering actual camp residents` numbers, which stand-- according to the TBBC´s 
July-December 2010 report-- at approx. 141,076 refugees (incl. 57,915 unregistered 
persons)106F107, this number doesn’t seem to be too high;  especially considering the 
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expected closure of the camps which was hoped for to be achieved with these 
resettlement operations, the expressed dissatisfaction of the Thai government is 
somewhat understandably. To a relatively large extent this stagnation of camp 
population numbers can be attributed to births and new arrivals to the camps; 
especially since the border itself as well as the borders of the camps are porous and 
thus hard to guard, movements are relatively frequent. Besides these stagnant 
numbers of refugees in the camp – which remains a major “thorn in the 
government´s side” – the issue of these still relatively high numbers of registered 
camp residents stands as a major point of concern to the government, as well as all 
operating organizations in the camps. 
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5. Theorizing movements – a discussion of migration theories 
108
  
Several years into the new millennium, the world´s population has reached seven 
million people. Among those, approx. 3% live outside their country of birth, either 
permanently or on a temporary basis. Given that migration theories have, from their 
inception, pointed to the “draw factor” that economically more developed countries 
have on less developed ones, this share of people should be much higher. However as 
has become increasingly criticized, is this notion of reducing migration explanations 
to the economic level, with the basic assumption that individuals try to simply 
maximize their economic well-being. What has been missing, and subsequently has 
become more and more the focus in migration research, are social factors, which, in 
varying degrees amongst economic ones, do indeed shape migration decisions in 
multiple ways. Migration movements are the result of complex human behavior and 
can therefore hardly be explained with a “one size fits all” (economic) model.108F109 
Moreover, when looking at numbers, migrants themselves actually represent merely 
a minority – migration theories, however, tend to keep focusing on this rather 
“abnormal behavior” group. Therefore, a lot still has to be done to catch up on 
insights into the motives of “stayers”, meaning individuals or groups who choose not 
to migrate.110 
 
“It´s a basic need of all humans to improve themselves in material ways.”111 
 
These were the words of Ernest George Ravenstein, “founder” of migration theory, 
who studied migration behavior in the context of the “high-time” of British labor 
movements in the late 19th century. Ravenstein, himself a cartographer and 
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demographists, believed firmly on the rationality of economic benefit-maximizing, 
with the individual being the main decision-maker. His findings were purely based on 
labor migration, little if any thoughts were put in for the case of refugee movements 
at that time.  
Follow up theories also tended to rely on Ravenstein´s basic assumptions; in all of 
them the principle of “economic rationalism” (Ewers 1931) and demographic factors 
were strongly represented. Coming out of this, the neoclassical model of migration is 
still seen as one of the “bases” of migration theory, according to which “international 
migration is caused by geographic differences in the supply and demand of labor”.111F112 
This means that in countries where you find a combination of one country with a 
relative abundance of (cheap) labor but accordingly low wages, and another country 
with comparable low amounts of available labor and therefore higher wages, 
migration is likely to occur from the former to the latter. Consequently, the 
relationship between labor availability and wages in both countries will change, 
leading to an eventual equilibrium. According to neoclassical theory, migration 
therefore only occurs as long as such wage differentials exist – put simply, with the 
end of wage differences comes an end to migration. The principle agent of the 
decision to migrate or not is the individual – he or she weighs all risks and possible 
benefits (obstacles might also be whether to cut social ties and the challenge of 
forming new ones) to come then to an informed conclusion.112F113 That such a basic 
concept is insufficient in explaining all migration movements is rather obvious, which 
has led to much critique on the theory; especially the assumption that individuals 
have full information about their options and complete freedom of choice and 
movement.  This assumption is absurd, as the reality is rather that potential migrants 
mostly have only limited information, resources and freedom of decision-making. 
However, for all its flaws, neoclassical thinking about migration does often still stand 
behind many national and regional policies even today.113F114  
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These assumptions were subsequently summarized in the so called “push-pull model:  
As the name suggests, potential migrants are “pushed” or “pulled” in either direction 
by different variables. While aspects of the “push”/”pull” model can be varied, 
researchers have pointed (again) to predominantly economic factors such as poverty, 
unemployment and general bad economic climate which “push” migrants out of their 
usual environments. Similarly,  higher wages, better education opportunities or also  
the prospect of a “safe haven” might act as “pull” factors.114F115 However, as much as 
such motivations are likely to play a role in migration, they are mostly just half the 
picture, as Olwig has argued:”[The above theories] … give  the  impression  that  
migrants  are  pushed  out  of  their  place  of  origin because of extraordinary 
conditions, or pulled away by attractive opportunities abroad. When  examining  
migration  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  life  stories  related  by members of the 
family networks, quite another picture emerges.”115F116 
Trying to amend the obvious shortcomings of the neoclassic model, sociologists, 
anthropologists and researchers of other disciplines than economics have 
subsequently come up with several alternatives.  One of the most cited is the 
dual/segmented labor market theory. Theorists such as Piore (1979) argue that, due 
to the structural demand for cheap labor in developed countries, a segmented labor 
market develops. Accordingly, international migration is caused by this demand, 
leading to migrants being primarily (or mostly  exclusively) employed in the “lower” 
spheres of the labor market. As Saskia Sassen has pointed out: ”[…] while the most 
dynamic `global cities` are market by economic polarization[,] a growing gulf between 
the highly paid core workers in finance, management and research, and the poorly 
paid workers who service their needs [emerges].”116F117 Belonging to one or the other 
group depends naturally not only on skills and education but also to a large part also 
on ethnic factors and whether a person is part of the majority or minority group . 
Also, so-called “enclave communities” or “ethnic entrepreneurs” facilitate the division 
of the labor market with their exclusive character focusing mostly on ethnicity and 
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origin. Namely, in many immigration countries ethnic groups tend to stay together, 
forming “ethnic communities” overseas; likewise, they often determine where a 
newcomer is likely to live, work and who his/her new friends and colleagues will 
be.”Ethnic entrepreneuers”, likewise, cater to “their” ethnic customers, devising their 
business success out of these communities for the reason of being “one of 
them”.Many immigrants old or new find themselves employed in the secondary labor 
market, because any other sector stays blocked for these groups; subsequently, these 
workers themselves introduce newcomers to similar jobs. Hence, dual labor market 
theory helps explain the role governments and employers (not to forget the market) 
play in migration by focusing on the segmentation of the labor market and its 
workers. Pointing to these ethnic communities also helps answer the question of why 
migration sustains itself even though wage differentials decline.1118 
Similarly looking at structural factors for migration were initiatives that developed 
from a Marxist perspective. What came to be known as the historical-institutional 
approach consisted of a focus on the worldwide “market”, where demand for cheap 
labor draws migration from the periphery countries to the center. But rather than 
arguing that such migration movements were voluntarily in order to maximize one`s 
own benefit, theories such as the world systems theory proclaim that such 
movements are rather structurally forced: migrants have no alternatives, as resources 
such as land or employment are taken from them in their own country of origin, 
forcing them to leave their lands and look for survival elsewhere. Theorists such as 
Wallerstein (1984) or Amin (1974) pointed to the fact that unfair terms of trade made 
it possible to incorporate peripheral nations into the global world order as 
“dependencies” of the (rich) core countries, which then tend to exploit these 
peripheral natural and human resources for their own consumption. However, 
structural-historical theories such as the world systems theory were soon criticized as 
well for having similar flaws as the neoclassical model; critiques pointed to the over-
stressing of structural factors and the dominant role of the state, while (again) 
neglecting the “human agency” factor of individuals and groups. This also meant that 
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such structural theories made the same mistake as its neoclassical counterpart in 
totally omitting social factors and the role ethnic or kinship ties might play.118F119  
Against theories as the above with their assumptions that it is the isolated individual 
who decides to migrate or not the new economics of migration model emphasizes the 
role of the family or large community unit. In fact, it points out that it is in the interest 
of every household or larger unit to minimize risks and secure a stable, reliable 
income for the whole family. In this concept, migration of some family members is 
seen as a strategy for risk-diversification: for example, if crops fail and consequently 
income falls in one year, there would still be the financial contributions of one or 
more family members who work abroad to support the family. In developed countries 
with a usually high reliance on insurances and other hedging opportunities, this might 
seem rather uninteresting; however, in countries of the global South, where access to 
financial sources and insurances are often unreliable or non-existent, such strategies 
are more understandable.120 Compared to neoclassic theory, which omits all social 
aspects in migration processes, the new economics of migration theory does seem to 
be more realistic in the way it tries to explain why migration occurs, as well as in the 
way it focuses on the influence of social groups in decision-making. Researchers relied 
on methods from sociology as well as anthropology for their analysis. However, again 
in this theory, even though the decision-making role of the larger household unit is 
emphasized, it is again economic reasons that are seen as the decisive motivation for 
migration or not.  
Summarizing, it becomes evident that in order to explain migration movements more 
holistically, factors such as social relations and ethnic bondages cannot be omitted. 
Especially in today`s globalized world, where communication and transportation 
technologies make it possible to stay in touch irrelevant of geographic distance, it has 
become necessary to look at migration as a more flexible, dynamic process. In pre-
globalised times, it might have been sufficient to look at migration as it occurs mostly 
from A to B, with relatively little communications remaining once the migrant had 
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moved.120F121 However, more and more it has become evident that migration, be it labor 
migration or forced migration, is not a one-way process. Rather, migrants do keep 
contact with their home region or remaining family or kinship members, which then 
again has a significant influence on these communities.  Coming out of this awareness 
were studies on network theory that “link migrants and non-migrants”.121F122 These 
networks are being upheld by modern technology, and form one of the basic support 
structures for migrants. As Boyd has pointed out: “Informal networks bind `migrants 
and non-migrants together in a complex web of social roles and interpersonal 
relationships`”123, which clearly points to the long neglected role that social factors 
play in migration. The growing interest in them stems from the awareness that they 
are crucial in understanding patterns of migration as well as settlement and, 
importantly, how these social factors influence links with “home”. They are “crucial” 
in the way that they constitute essential sources of financial and social support, 
especially for newcomers. Consequently, it has become widely accepted today that 
migration is never an isolated, individualistic action but rather occurs in the context of 
a more or less stable and strong network.123F124  
Connecting to this is the concept of so-called “social capital”; going back to the 
theories of Bourdieu and Coleman at the end of the 1980s. As has been argued, 
“[s]ocial capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”1125 Social 
capital therefore relates to the amount of social contact a potential migrant has at 
the destination country, on which he or she can then rely on and draw advantage 
from. Consequently, the closer the relationship is between an already migrated 
individual and a potential migrant, the more it becomes likely that the latter one will 
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eventually move as well.125F126 However the converse could hold true as well, and the 
closer the relationship an individual has with family members/the community at 
home, the less likely he or she might be to move away.  
This brings us to the deficit of social capital and network theory, namely the dominant 
assumption that social relations help facilitate migration, make it more likely and 
more attractive by providing the necessary human contacts for to-be migrants. A lot 
of research has been done on motivations for migration, but rather few on 
constraints for migration, be it economic, political or social ones. Even though 
research on how the status quo in the original community might influence migration 
decisions had been taken up by researchers in the 1950s, it has never gained as much 
popularity as its counterpart, which is quite understandable given the fact that 
countries` policies up to today are much more interested in foreseeing migration, in 
order to control arrivals at their doorstep.126F127  
Individuals are not “separate atoms”, but rather embedded in a whole set of social 
surroundings, which do influence to various degrees the decision to migrate. 
Moreover, the individual´s own benefit might not always be the dominant motive; 
depending on ethnic and social obligations and loyalties, the larger family´s or 
community´s benefit (which doesn’t have to be the same as the individual´s) may be 
the initiating factor.127F128 Shared beliefs and norms may be influencing an individual´s 
own wishes; also, how migration is seen by others, how migrants are judged by the 
wider community, in other words, the “culture of migration” might have significant 
influence on potential migrants.128F129 Feelings of solidarity, be it towards an “imagined 
community” (as may be likely especially for refugee groups) or towards one´s own 
family might prevent individuals from moving; a felt obligation of having to help 
others, dependant on cultural customs and norms, may deter out-migration. For 
example, as mentioned above, this might be likely seen in refugee situations where a 
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feeling of “having to stick together” might prevail. As will be discussed in more detail 
below, this also applies to the Burmese refugee situation in Thailand, where some of 
the interviewees stated hesitance to resettle because of family members still 
remaining in Burma. 
Concepts such as the “affinity hypothesis” or “familism”129F130 have been drawn up, 
countering the prevailing argument that networks not necessarily increase migration, 
but strong attachments to family and community at “home” might actually hinder 
migration.130F131 As Sonja Haug has pointed out: ”Social networks at the place of 
residence are a preventive factor.”131F132  
Summarizing, there is still need to look at communities of origin and the role they 
play in migration; as has been pointed out, decisions to move or not (or who should 
move) are mostly not taken on an individualistic level, but rather depend largely on 
the surrounding community and bonds with family or kinships.132F133 When we look at 
current countries of emigration, which mostly consist of countries of the “global 
South”, it makes sense to look at how family and community is built up in these 
societies, precisely because family cohesion often seems to play a greater role than 
may be the case in “Western” countries. Accordingly, and as will be further argued, in 
terms of the specific case of resettlement regulations it makes little sense to impose a 
“one fits all” concept of “family” on the respective refugee community as, most likely 
and as has been evident in the past, such regulations clash with local concepts, and 
have little chance of creating positive results for all stakeholders involved. 
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5.1. Hypothesis: Social aspects tend to be neglected 
“Sometimes the basic problem is not why people migrate but rather why they do 
not.”F
134
 
With the above outline of major migration theories I have tried to show the 
deficiencies that those models have, with their dominant reliance on economic 
motivations and the neglect of social surroundings in the home region. I argue that 
for a better understanding of what drives migration and to better comprehend 
migrants` reasonings for migration, any theory of migration must include more of the 
social fabric that surrounds (potential) migrants, meaning to look at how they are 
integrated in their own social networks and influenced by obligations towards family 
and kin. This is of course foregone by the assumption that not only are there social 
nets that surround migrants, but even more so in many emigration societies, these 
are significantly stricter and wider than what we see in destination countries in the 
“West”. “Stricter” in the sense that social connections are taken more seriously; 
valuing one´s kin and family is seen as a key component of social relations. “Wider” in 
a way that the circle of connected relatives spans beyond the “nuclear family”, also 
including more distant relatives who nevertheless are seen closely connected to 
oneself.  
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6. Concretizing theory – the case of Tham Hin camp  
 
The theoretical concepts of migration models have been discussed in the previous 
section; moreover, I argued that it is social factors that often play a significant role in 
migration decisions, but which nevertheless tend to get neglected and overshadowed 
by more “obvious” factors such as economic motivations. If they do get addressed, 
research tends to focus on the circumstances in the destination community and the 
transnational links influencing the move. Seldom do the situation and the background 
in the origin country get the attention they deserve.  
Consequently, on the concrete example of Tham Hin camp, which is one of the nine 
“temporary shelters” in Thailand for Burmese refugees, I will demonstrate the role 
that such factors in the “home base” can have on the decision on whether or not to 
migrate. Moreover, here in this “real case” example, the situation in the outgoing 
location should clearly not be omitted when looking at considerations for migration, 
as they are the primary influencing factor. 
The reason for choosing Tham Hin is based on the author`s field work from July to 
September 2010. As it is also the camp where resettlement operation had been first 
started, and where they had subsequently been closed again in 2009, Tham Hin, in a 
way, represents a full “cycle” of a resettlement operation, and is therefore a prime 
example on which to illustrate above argument.  
 
6.1. Background – Tham Hin camp 
Tham Hin camp is situated in Ratchaburi province, Suanpheung district, approx. three 
hours drive from Bangkok. The location is rather secluded close to the border, 
although the nearest Thai village is not even one kilometer away. Access to the camp 
is difficult, as the road leading towards it is in bad condition and only accessible with a 
four wheel drive or similar type of vehicle. The camp falls under the responsibility of 
UNHCR Kanchanaburi Field Office, which also administers, apart from Tham Hin, the 
Ban Dong Yang camp. The sub-office is located in Kanchanaburi city, about 1,5 hrs. 
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drive from the camp. Tham Hin camp is one of the most crowded “temporary 
shelters”, spreading about 11 hectares/28 acres, with houses being cramped 
together, leaving only tiny walkways in between. Open spaces for recreation are 
similarly rare. Water supply comes from a nearby stream, diverted into communal 
taps which provide water several times a day. Electricity is non-existent, as are phone 
signals. Compared to the biggest camp, Mae La, some hundred kilometers north, 
which has access to the Internet and which is very well connected to major trade and 
communication routes, Tham Hin is comparably remote and cut-off from its 
surroundings. Consequently, residents have less, or at least more difficult, 
opportunities to exchange with surrounding Thai communities, to access other 
information or stay in touch with family, friends outside the camp.  Also, there is 
consequently less trade with Thai vendors etc. in Tham Hin.134F135  
The camp population shares a common linguistic, ethnic and cultural background; 
even though the majority´s ethnicity is Karen (approx. 98%), followed by Burmans 
(approx. 1,4%) and a very small portion of other minority groups, ethnically motivated 
tensions are not a problem.135F136 Religious affiliation is predominantly Christian (approx. 
82%), followed by Buddhists (approx. 17%) and a very small minority being Muslim 
(approx. 0,04%).136F137 The majority of residents are between 18-59 years (46%), 
followed by 5-17 years (33%). Very young (‹ 5yrs), as well as › 60yrs are rather few, 
with 15% and 5% respectively.137F138 Approx. 68% of residents are married, about 26% 
are single, and the rest are widowed. Predominantly, as has also been reflected 
during interviews, the overall majority of residents have a rural background, having 
lived in rural Burma in their respective ethnic communities prior to finding 
themselves inhabiting the camp. Consequently, most refugees in Tham Hin have been 
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 TBBC homepage http://www.tbbc.org/camps/skb.htm#th, #Tham Hin; personal observation July – 
September 2010. 
136
 Ethnic composition varies with camp location – for example in the camps in northern Thailand the 
predominant ethnic group are the Karenni, in others the Shan are the major group. This depends 
mostly on the locations of the respective ethnic bases across the border in Burma, where refugees 
have fled from (cf. TBBC www.tbbc.org (#Camps).  
137
 That the majority of residents is Christian is somewhat surprising, as Christians are usually only a 
minority among all Karen subgroups (see page 76). 
138
 UNHCR Tham Hin camp profile information sheet 2010:1, numbers as of March 2010. It should be 
noted however that such biodata are always a “snapshot”, frozen in time, as a refugee population is 
always in flux of people coming and going. 
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fleeing violence done to them or seen impaired on others, instead of having actively 
engaged in political activities against the government, therefore the sex distribution 
in the camp is also relatively balanced between male/female because usually it is 
whole villages or whole families which have fled together.139  
Despite the limitedness of living space, the general health situation is good, so are 
nutrition levels – however, as mentioned below, if the announced tightening of food 
distributions in Tham Hin will be taken seriously, this could result in a worsening of 
nutrition levels in the future.  
Though movement is restricted and working outside the camp is not allowed, most 
male refugees do engage in some form of manual, informal work in the vicinity of the 
camp, predominantly as day laborers on one of the local plantations or farms etc.  
The camp is one of the oldest, having been consolidated out of several smaller 
settlements following the attacks by the tatmadaw on the KNU (Karen National 
Union) bases opposite the border in 1997. 138F140 Large refugee movements followed, 
which subsequently resulted in the Thai government´s decision to combine the 
existing settlements into a bigger, fenced-in camp, Tham Hin. Original resident 
numbers were approx. 7,200 persons; over the years, this increased steadily, and fell 
only after the initiation of the US resettlement program, which decreased numbers as 
of September 2010 down to somewhat over the 4000 mark (registered persons only). 
However, as this count only takes in registered persons (meaning approved by the 
PAB screening exercises), the actual number of Tham Hin residents is quite higher, 
and, as previously noted, fluctuates significantly. For example, a head-count exercise 
which was done prior to the start of resettlement operations in 2004 in order to “fix” 
the population of Tham Hin resulted in another 1,030 previously unregistered 
persons subsequently being registered. Another count in 2007 documented again 
                                                      
139
 However, as mentioned in chapter 7, there are more adult women in Tham Hin than there are adult 
men; this stems from the fact that even though usually the men didn’t stay behind in Burma, they 
nevertheless now often leave the camp for work, or have gone straight to work illegally in Thailand 
without entering the camp altogether. Likewise, some husbands are KNU soldiers and are hence not 
living in the camp.  
140
 As became clear during the interviews taken, all interviewees stated to have come to Tham Hin in 
1997. 
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over 2000 unregistered persons. As has been mentioned previously, another round of 
“pre-screenings” by the PAB in March 2009 resulted in 2,895 persons, who had 
previously been unregistered, becoming “slip-holders”.139F141  
Overall, between January 2005 and September 2010, UNHCR Thailand has submitted 
more than 110,000 Burmese refugees for resettlement to a total of 15 countries, of 
which the US is the major taker. As noted previously, in light of the fact that 
resettlement places can be likened to “winning the lottery”, so to speak, this is an 
“astronomical” number of resettlement places from one single country, and is in fact 
the biggest UNHCR resettlement operation worldwide. The same applies for the 
acceptance rate, which lies at nearly 99%.140F142 Also unusual is the generosity of this US 
resettlement operation: it happens not often that everybody is able to come forward 
and apply for resettlement, which is an exception to the usual struggle for UNHCR to 
select the “lucky few”. In fact, Burmese refugees have the very rare opportunity to 
choose resettlement.141F143 
As for the pilot-project to start US resettlement operations, Tham Hin represented a 
reasonable choice in 2005, due to its crowded conditions which had been kept 
intentionally rudimentary by the Thai government. Also, according to Refugees 
International, a relatively large share of Tham Hin residents already has resettled 
family members in the United States.142F144  
Even though resettlement numbers in Tham Hin have been rising gradually over time, 
at the closure of the program in 2009 about 30% of residents were remaining despite 
the offer – a number that was surprising to all parties involved. Remaining residents 
were subsequently referred to as “fence-sitters”, meaning refugees who just didn’t 
make up their mind or would rather wait for the best “package” offered.143F145 At the 
same time, resettlement has proven to have significant side-effects: Now referred to 
commonly as “chuwa ma yeh, ga ma ye” (“between a rock and a hard place”), 
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 UNHCR Tham Hin camp profile information sheet 2010: 2f  
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 Smith/UNHCR 2010:2 
143
 Smith/UNHCR 2010:2 
144
 However, as will be shown with the interview results, this only applies to some of the interviewees` 
cases, and is far from being the norm.  
145
 Smith/UNHCR 2010:2 
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refugees and camp workers feel the gaps that resettlement has created 
tremendously. Obviously, it is the skilled who take the opportunity to leave the camp 
first, but without providing for subsequent workers to fill the open positions in the 
camps, the situation of the remaining population worsens. As a result, resettlement in 
all camps has become a “love/hate issue”, for refugees, as for camp workers.144F146 
The ultimate motive behind the commencement of US resettlement operations in 
Tham Hin was to be able to eventually close down the camp; however, apart from the 
remaining eligible refugees who denied resettling, departures are at least partly filled 
again with either births or new arrivals. Alone in the post election period after 
November 2010, new arrivals to all of the nine camps have apparently been 
numbering about 10,000.145F147 Thus, the previous success of the resettlement operation 
of the Hmong of Wat Thamkrabok didn’t work to the same degree in Tham Hin.  This 
“success story” which had gone exceptionally smooth and quick surely was a factor 
that contributed positively to convince the Thai government that the “magnet effect” 
(which an announced resettlement program often creates) could be prevented again 
for the case of Burmese refugees. However, when looking at current camp resident´s 
numbers, this clearly didn’t prove to be the case for Tham Hin.  Moreover, while the 
number of registered residents prior to resettlement operations stood at around 
9,500 registered persons, this number had only gone down about halfway, with the 
registered number, as stated above, remaining at 4,348 refugees as of September 
2010. In total, 10,457 refugees have eventually either departed for resettlement out 
of Tham Hin camp or are in the process of departure.148At the same time, this 
number shows how many people would be living in Tham Hin, if there had been no 
resettlement operation at all.149  
When looking at the numbers of residents and resettlement across all nine camps, 
UNHCR suggests that the longer the resettlement operations stays open, the higher 
the number of people applying for it eventually climbs. This is rather obvious 
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 Banki/Lang 2008:29f; Fuller/Pittaway/Karen Women´s Organization 2008:45f; Banki/Lang 2007:6f 
147
 Integrated Regional Information Network March 2011  
148
 Approx. 6100 are actually departed (Smith/UNHCR 2010:4). 
149
 Smith/UNHCR 2010:3f 
On exact numbers see Appendix III. 
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considering that when neighbors, family and friends leave and subsequently good 
news arrive back in the camp, even more “unwilling” refugee may consider 
moving.148F150  
However, the eventual goal of this very generous and large-scale operation was to 
bring down camp numbers significantly, and to eventually be able to close down 
some, if not all nine camps. Looking at the actual resident numbers as of September 
2010, however, makes it obvious that this goal hasn’t been achieved. Rather, there 
has been at least partly a “re-filling” of places, which is one of the major concerns 
with the current situation. Accordingly, with resettlement operations obviously not 
bringing down refugee numbers to zero, the Thai government is growing increasingly 
impatient. This impatience has been marked by recent announcements at the time of 
writing of planning to close down the camps eventually. Further, in February this year 
TBBC, which runs the day-to-day distributions of food and other essential stuff, was 
ordered to change their food distribution system to hand out food to registered 
persons only. Also in Tham Hin, apart from the general registered population, only 
vulnerable unregistered persons will henceforth be allowed to receive food 
rations.149F151  
 
6.2. Survey design 
Tham Hin was chosen for the survey because it had seen a “full cycle” of resettlement 
operations: as the US pilot program started in 2005, after four and a half years a “last 
call” was announced, giving refugees another three months to finally make up their 
minds. In the end, of an initial population of about 9,500, by September 2010 approx. 
7,600 had eventually resettled or were in the process of doing so, whereas some 
3000 hadn´t shown an interest in resettlement or had withdrawn their application, 
which is about 30% of the registered population. 
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 Smith/UNHCR 2010:2 
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 E.g. single mothers, unaccompanied minors, handicapped or other persons with special needs ( 
Yoshikawa 2011:2). 
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The primary focus of the resettlement survey done in Tham Hin camp was to better 
understand reasons behind the high number of resettlement withdrawals. Similarly, 
better insights on how refugees consider resettlement and third country conditions 
were anticipated; by better understanding fears and worries refugees have about 
resettlement, gaps in the information and preparation process could be filled, in 
order to give refugees more confidence when moving and subsequently increase the 
number of persons resettling in the other camps in Thailand for which resettlement 
operations are planned. 
Research was done between July and September 2010 and included approx. 15 field 
trips to Tham Hin camp. The survey consisted of two parts, with the first one 
consisting of interviews (henceforth referred as Part I), and the second part of focus 
group discussions (henceforth referred to as Part II).  
Concerning Part I1
152
 
Interviews were half-structured, consisting of 54 questions which were either open 
questions leaving room for interviewees` own explanations, multiple answers or 
yes/no answer questions. As the focus was clearly on understanding reasons for non-
resettlement, the interviews were problem-centered and clearly focused on this 
issue. Additionally in order to understand the individual´s background, demographic 
questions were asked at the beginning.  
Consequently, due to including quantitative as well as qualitative questions with 
more or less open answers, Part I can be located between a qualitative and a 
quantitative approach. There was a clear outline of questions asked, whose 
continuing order could be changed somewhat by the interviewer during the interview 
when necessary. After understanding the demographic background of the 
interviewee, issues connected to resettlement perceptions in general, as well the 
interviewees´ personal experience with the resettlement process were asked, as were 
questions regarding the individual`s personal flight history. Further, questions were 
raised regarding family issues, such as whether any family members were still 
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Full questionnaire on request to the author.  
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remaining in Burma or whether some had already resettled (or where in the process 
of) resettling to a third country. Also, questions regarding future plans were 
addressed.  If not already done so during the interview, refugees were given room at 
the end of the interview to ask own questions; also, there was room for the 
interviewer to note down comments etc.  
The interview style was rather “soft”, in order to build an aura of trust and 
assurance151F153; naturally, there was some suspicion on participants` side when being 
questioned by UNHCR staff, as well as being interviewed about why they wouldn’t 
resettle. Consequently, it made sense to give refugees a feeling of not judging 
answers given, and to encourage them with fitful nods etc. to bring forward their 
opinions. 
As an introduction the purpose of the survey was explained, and the respective 
interviewer and interpreter were introduced. Participants were also informed that 
they had been selected randomly; participating in the interview would not have any 
influence on any resettlement action they might consider now or at a later stage. 
Information given would be treated confidentially.  
For Part I four (female) interviewers were active, which were UNHCR staff of the 
Kanchanaburi office as well as the author. Only one spoke Karen and Burmese, which 
made it necessary to have answers translated by an UNHCR interpreter.  As will be 
taken up again further on, answers may therefore have been contorted to some 
extent by translation. Interviews were done either in the participants´ home, at the 
respective section office or at the UNHCR workstation in Tham Hin camp. The average 
duration was approx. 20-30 minutes per interview. Part I was completed until end of 
August 2010. 
Originally 107 individual Head of Households were selected using UNHCR´s ProGres 
database which contains all registered152F154 camp residents. Pre-selection was done 
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  As classified by Grunow (see Grunow 1978, in Hiermansperger/Greindl no date:5). 
154
 Again, it is important to note that the most basic prerequisite for resettlement eligibility is being 
registered by the PAB; being a “slip-holder” is insufficient. This plays a major role in reasons for opting 
out of resettlement, as will be discussed in detail further below. 
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taking only those individuals whose cases were withdrawn from resettlement and 
who were heads of households.153F155 Out of this listing, every 5th person was chosen.  
Out of these 107 interviewees selected, 69 interviews could eventually be completed. 
Concerning Part II154F
156 
In order to get an insight into different opinions individuals might have about 
resettlement according to age and/or gender, six groups were identified again using 
the UNHCR ProGres database. However, as very specific individuals were sought, 
participants for the below group discussions were selected based on their profile, 
with again the precondition of being head of household. During the selection process 
it became evident that the number of possible participants would be rather small, 
especially for groups c), d), e) and f).  Previously, it was planned to limit the age group 
for the adolescent groups from 14-17; however, it became evident very soon that 
they were literally no “heads of households” in the camp who were that young, and 
who would be responsible for their own resettlement decision. Consequently, the age 
group was changed to 18-24, which was nevertheless quite difficult to fill. Also, as can 
be seen below, the SPN (Special Needs) group155F157 was very small, due to participants 
either not showing up at all  or not being able to participate due to various problems.  
In order of discussion round taken, groups were  
a) Female adult group age 18-59 (6-10 participants) (7)156F158 
b) Male adult group age 18-59 (6-10 participants)  (6) 
c) Female adolescent group age 18-24  (5-8 participants) (5) 
d) Male adolescent group age 18-24  (5-8 participants)  (3) 
e) Elderly group 60+ any age (5-8 participants)  (5) 
f) SPN group any age (5-8 participants)  (2) 
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 Generally, it is the (male) head of household who makes the resettlement decision for the whole 
family; therefore, it made sense to question specifically those cases. However, in cases where the male 
head of household was not available, his wife was interviewed as a substitute. 
156
 See Appendix IV for a complete list of questions asked. 
157
 Special Needs are mostly refugees with physical or mental impairments, as well as single mothers, 
unaccompanied minors, the elderly etc.  
158
 Numbers in brackets are actual participation numbers. 
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Location: UNHCR Workstation, Tham Hin camp; for the discussion rounds, chairs were 
placed in a circle, with drinks and snacks provided.  Duration: approx. 30-40min per 
group. All group discussions were completed at the beginning of September 2010. 
One UNHCR staff as well as the author were facilitating the six discussions; there 
were also two of the precedent interviewers acting as note takers, as well as one 
interpreter. All notes taken were subsequently evaluated and analyzed by the author. 
Part II was guided in the way that basic questions were asked, which had been 
formulated prior. As the question order was flexible, some of the questions were 
omitted when they proved to be not fitting or had already been answered. 
Additionally, other (side) questions were asked occasionally, to keep the discussion 
going or to get further clarification.  
Even though Tham Hin is relatively small, not all participants know each other. 
Therefore, as an introduction the survey team decided on some “ice-breaking” games 
before starting the general discussion.  For example, refugees were asked to stand in 
line according to the number of children they had, or to draw their favorite fruit on a 
sheet of paper. This proved to be an appropriate way to help open up the group.  
The survey team members were introduced by the interpreter; as had been done 
previously prior to the interviews, participants were informed that their statements 
would have no impact on their resettlement cases or their cases in general; 
information given was confidential. Also, refugees were informed about how they 
had been selected, using the ProGres database that is known to Tham Hin residents 
as well.  
Subsequently, participants were asked for such basic information as their name, age, 
and for how long they were in the camp. Following questions were then, as the 
precedent interviews, centered on the main issue of resettlement and refugees` 
perceptions thereof. The survey team tried to get a general knowledge about 
participants’ background, family connections and experiences refugees might have 
had with the resettlement process in general. Also, questions were asked concerning 
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fears and worries about resettlement and/or the situation in 3rd countries, or 
problems participants might think of encountering.  
 
6.2.1. Problems encountered 
As stated above, 107 individual´s cases were chosen from ProGres for the interview 
part; however, only 70 of those could be completed. A major “challenge” the survey 
team encountered was to find the relevant individuals: Tham Hin camp is organized 
into zones which are subdivided again into sections, with the respective zone and 
section leaders being members of the community. As the section leaders generally 
know all residents of their respective section, it made sense to approach the section 
leaders with the list of requested individuals. However, in some cases, either even the 
section leader him/herself did not know the person (e.g. the individual searched had 
moved sections), or it turned out that the individual´s whereabouts where not known 
to the section leader and/or neighbors, family etc. In a relatively large number of 
cases the person had gone out for work, either on a daily basis or for a longer period 
of time, making it impossible to interview him157F159. In some of these cases interviewers 
chose to question the wife instead of the head of household, if she was available.158F160  
Similarly with Part II, some chosen individuals were rather unwilling and/or not 
interested in participating in the focus group discussions. Even after inviting them 
personally by visiting their houses, a rather large number of the individuals chosen for 
the group discussions simply didn’t show up at the UNHCR workstation on the 
planned date and time. One staff member of the survey team mentioned that 
refugees didn’t expect to gain anything out of participating; they weren’t interested 
in resettlement in the first place, and therefore – even when invited personally by a 
member of the survey team – weren’t willing to show up.  
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 In almost all cases the man leaves for work outside the camp, hardly any woman goes outside for 
work. 
160
 However, when the wife was taken as a substitute for the husband, mostly answers were that the 
resettlement decision was the husband´s choice and that he didn’t want to go. So whenever possible 
interviewers tried to interview the male head of household. 
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Further, as has been mentioned, it proved difficult to fill certain discussion groups; 
especially for adolescents as well as the elderly and SPN group, initial criteria couldn’t 
be met. This made it necessary to relax the admission criteria somewhat. Age limits 
were altered from 14-17 to 18-24 for the two adolescent groups. Also, information as 
stated in ProGres proved to be at times not up to date: SPN cases had 
changed/resolved itself, or addresses weren’t accurate anymore.  
Also, conversations with participants had to be translated from Karen to English, 
which is likely to have had an impact on answers given.  
Stemming from their different positions and tasks, the relationship between staff of 
organizations working in the camps and refugees is a rather official one. Thai or 
international staff do not, in almost all cases, speak Karen, Burmese or any other of 
refugees´ languages. Also, outside workers are only in camp at most a few times a 
week for a few hours, meaning that interactions with the camp population generally 
remain on a rather work-oriented basis. This is likely to have influenced answers given 
by refugees during interviews; likewise, being completely “foreign” to the camp and 
the population may have had an effect on refugees´ answers during interviews which 
were done by the author. Also, even though the survey team tried to close the 
interview session to outside listeners, due to the open construction of the huts and 
the crowdedness of the camp this was not always possible. Subsequently, feeling 
“listened to” may have influenced answers to some degree.   
Last but not least, it must be mentioned that the ultimate motive of this survey was 
to find out gaps and insufficiencies in UNHCR´s protection scheme regarding 
resettlement, meaning to see what can be done better in order to increase 
resettlement numbers. Therefore, the survey was done in a rather “functional”, 
technical oriented style, without the claim to be scientific. This is especially reflected 
in the questions asked during Part I. It should be taken into account when analyzing 
the data on a more sociological approach. 
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6.3. Data analysis – methodology 
As an approach to analyzing qualitative material, Philipp Mayring, at the beginning of 
the 1980s, has developed a technique that has become known as “content 
analysis”.159F161  Based in principle on a quantitative content analysis, he emphasizes 
coding the original material, a similar approach as the grounded theory builds on. The 
basis for developing theoretical statements develops through a category system 
which is based on the original data, where statements of interviewees are organized 
according to their content. While shifting through the original material, as a first step, 
similar answers are summarized, forming categories of similar answers. Secondly, 
these categories are further generalized, leading to abstract concepts which form the 
theoretical final statements.   
However, even these final concepts are not fixed at all; rather, their stability has to be 
re-checked again on the original material by controlling if given answers are, in fact, 
only fitting into exclusively one category. This “dry run” allows for a possible re-
adaption of the existing categories and/or the concepts themselves, if necessary. 
Essentially, by encoding, the existing material gradually gets reduced, the most 
concise answers get “crystallized out”, and this process finally leads to abstractions 
that are nevertheless still an image of the original data. As a result, the concepts 
which are developed by encoding are theoretical statements which shall be 
interpreted subsequently.160F162  
Mayring´s technique is sometimes criticized for relying too much on a quantitative 
approach and for ultimately analyzing frequencies (only), instead of extracting 
information. By categorizing, the context of the original answers gets lost, making it 
impossible to identify causal connections. In short, for evaluating complex, subjective 
material (as with interviews or group discussions) it is inappropriate to use such more 
or less fixed categories, because they potentially hide the context of given answers 
and therefore can distort the final interpretation. Also, the question inevitably arises 
as to what bases these categories and concepts are built; as with all qualitative 
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 However, this is not meant in the sense of the Anglo-American “content analysis” which is strictly 
quantitative.  
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 Cf. Mayring 2002:100;114f; Cropley 2002:127ff; Hiermansperger/Greindl  no date:6 
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research, its analysis and interpretation will always be essentially subjective and to a 
large extent dependant on the researcher´s own personal experiences and 
background. Results are compiled through personal interactions between the 
researcher and his/her subjects. Compared to quantitative “sterile” research, 
qualitative data interpretation is therefore almost “humane”, as Klotz has pointed 
out. At the same time, this also means that analyzing qualitatively compiled data is 
much more “chaotic” and “unsure” against the much more “uncompromising”, 
“reliable” quantitative statistics.161F163  
Consequently, doubts regarding qualitative research´s validity have always been its 
main point of criticism. However, as Mayring and others argue, qualitative research´s 
main goal is in the formation of theoretical statements out of empirical material, 
rather than in proving a certain reality with statistical “hard facts”; therefore it does 
not proclaim to hold any “ultimate, unchangeable truth”.162F164 Consequently, every 
empirical study and its analysis is only one possible interpretation of the given data; 
qualitative results do not claim to be holding any “exclusive truth” and, naturally, the 
same applies for the here discussed results and their interpretation.  
Despite the justified criticism with qualitative research and Mayring´s technique, I 
have decided on using Mayring´s approach for analyzing the collected data of the 
Tham Hin survey because taking into account the frequencies of given answers has 
meaning in and of itself: Against the above mentioned critique that taking answers 
out of context and merely “counting them” may distort the interpretation, I argue 
that precisely the frequency of a given (similar) answer shows its weight among the 
camp population regarding the central question, “Why not resettlement?”. Also, as 
the topic of the survey was relatively narrow, all answers were given in the context of 
the overall question regarding about resettlement, therefore the risk of interpreting 
given answers out of context was relatively minor. Consequently, organizing given 
answers in categories makes sense as to show where core concerns lie.  
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 Cf. Klotz 2002:55ff 
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 Cf. Gläser/Laudel 2009:198f; Mayer 2009:22f; Klotz 2002:18ff;25f; Mayring 2002:100f 
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Answers of all interviews were subsequently entered into Excel and assigned to the 
respective questions. This alleviated organizing the categorizing and coding as 
mentioned above. Moreover, the semi-structured interview style with largely 
predetermined guided questions resulted in already relatively short answers. For the 
process of encoding, this alleviated the “stripping down” to only relevant sentences 
markedly, as insignificant sentences or filling words etc. were largely absent in the 
original answers Subsequently, the summarized statements were organized further, 
and summarized broader. In case answers regarding resettlement were multi-causal 
(e.g. “I wouldn’t know how to cope” and “I have an unregistered brother”), both 
explanations were taken into the respective categories. Similarly, statements made 
during the focus group discussions were also taken into the category system. 
 
6.4. Interpretation  
For the coding process, all answers were taken into account. However, answers 
directly related to the question of why the individual wouldn’t resettle predictably 
proved to be the most useful in terms of categorizing (Question 18, 43, 55). As for 
drawing up categories, it soon became evident that “reason types”, rather than 
“types of individuals” or other factors were the bases on which it made sense to 
structure answers. Subsequently, the following concepts developed.  
a)  Social ties and obligations 
b) Coping worries 
c) Contention 
d) Overstrain 
e) Passiveness 
Among these “reason types”, social ties and obligations were the most prevalent; 
concerns about social connections and thoughts and considerations of family 
members were by far the most predominant statements for non-resettlement.  
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As for the above hypothesis that social ties ought to be included into migration 
theories as important factors, they are therefore the most fitting.  
However, apart from this, reasons such as “coping worries” or “contention” resemble 
more the conventional Rational Choice theory, and what we were  assuming to hear 
from potential migrants when considering to move or not. They therefore reflect the 
“typical” rationing whether the benefits of moving would outweigh the benefits of 
staying.  
Regarding the definition of borders between categories, especially for Group a) 
distinctions were prone to be blurred. Accordingly, I have chosen to divide Group a) 
answers into whether the individual is held back by somebody else`s decision, the 
status of somebody else (not being able to resettle), whether the individual is held 
back by the unwillingness of somebody else, or lastly, family members remaining in 
Burma. However, in the process of generalizing these categories into a more abstract 
concept, I have summarized them as all being connected to social relations, in one 
way or another. 
In the further section the concepts´ contents as well as the interpretation will be 
described in more detail.  
 
6.4.1. Regarding a) Social ties and obligations 
I have termed this first concept “social ties and obligations” because answers were 
either related to family or community ties, be it immediate family members or more 
distant ones, or connected to a feeling of obligation and bond with the wider 
community.  
A very significant majority of refugees163F165 stated that they had withdrawn their 
individual resettlement application due to other members of their family not being 
able to join them. This was due to having family members that were either not 
registered at all (e.g. having arrived to Tham Hin rather recently), or only being slip-
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holder (having gone through one of the PAB pre-registration exercises). This was 
evident during interviews, as well as a major answer through all focus group 
discussions regardless of gender/age.  Some participants also stated that one or more 
of their immediate family members were living outside the camp (and/or married to a 
Thai person), which made them stay in the camp rather than resettle on their own or 
leave this member behind. Some female interviewees mentioned that their husbands 
were KNU soldiers outside the camp, some others said that they couldn’t resettle 
because their husbands were working on fishing boats in southern Thailand. 
Interviews suggest that it is generally male refugees that leave the camp for work; if 
women leave, it is often to live in a nearby Thai village and/or to get married to a Thai 
national.  
Therefore, the patriarchal structure, with generally the father/husband being the 
dominant figure in the household as well as the main decision-maker, became 
evident at an early stage of the survey. Frequent answers were “My husband doesn’t 
want to go”, or also “My father-in law doesn’t want to go”. This connects to the 
above mentioned situation where the husband is (temporarily) outside the camp and 
the wife stays behind with the children. There were only two cases where the 
husband seemed to “obey” the wishes of his wife.  
Answers suggest that individuals´ decisions are mostly based on community behavior 
– some stated that they wouldn’t move because “nobody else (in their family) did”, or 
“nobody else around me (in the neighborhood) did”. Similarly, the notion of being 
influenced by what the wider community thinks or does influences the individuals´ 
decision. Statements such as “We fled together, so our fate is bound together” or 
“There are still many people in the camp” reflect this. 
As expected, filial duty towards parents was evident in answers given: children stated 
that they couldn’t leave behind their elderly parents or other (disabled) family 
members. However, the same applied to the parents, who in many cases referred to 
the unwillingness of their children to resettle as for their reason for withdrawal.  
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Feeling obligated or attached to remaining family members in Burma was a main 
concern for some of the persons interviewed; however in these cases it was explicitly 
an individual´s own family members, rather than one´s own ethnic group remaining in 
Burma or the Burmese people in general towards which an obligation was felt. 
Interviewees stated that they were either in direct contact with relatives in Burma or 
waiting for them to come.  
It is interestingly to note that in this group, which stated socially related reasons as 
their main withdrawal motivation, not in a single case were notions of “friendship” 
raised; participants of Part I as well as Part II stated not wanting to become separated 
from family members, or to leave behind family members as their main reason, but 
except for the few statements where comments such as “having to stick together as a 
group” were mentioned, it was constantly family members, however distant, that 
were the decisive factor. Forestalling, this is closely connected to cultural issues 
regarding family and kinship ties in Burma, which will be the focus further below. 
Table 1.1 shows Group a) in more detail; the three variables compared (PRE/unreg. 
family members, RSTed/currently processed family members, remaining family 
members in Burma) are connected to what I call “social ties”, meaning social 
connections that may either “hold back” an individual in the camp, or may also 
“draw” him/her to resettlement (as for already RSTed/processing family members).  
As can be seen, the majority of this socially motivated group has either unregistered 
or only pre-registered family members and/or family members remaining in 
Myanmar, which correlates most obviously to their stated reasons for non-
resettlement. Only one interviewee has only resettled family members, but no “ties” 
to hold him/her back. As discussed previously, migration theory, e.g. the network 
approach, suggests for such cases that already having migrated family makes it more 
likely for the remaining family members to move as well; social contacts overseas act 
as an incentive for potential migrants by providing assistance and “smoothing the 
way”. Therefore, if strictly applying that theory, there should be no cases in the 
sampled population that have only resettled family members, but no other ties which 
may hold them back. Looking at this single case closer, however, reveals that it is, 
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again, unwilling family members who, even though eligible, are not resettling and 
therefore holding the individual back. 
Five out of the 47 cases fulfill neither of the variables, and remain blank for all three 
fields; however, looking at these cases more closely reveals again that even though 
they have neither of the three criteria, their main motivation is nevertheless 
resettlement-unwilling family members.  
In order to see if these variables are more frequent for this socially motivated group 
than for the others, Table 1.2. compares all other groups on the same variables.  As 
can be seen, there is no outstanding difference in terms of the criteria observed 
between the two tables. This suggests that even though interviewees of Table 1.2. 
may have social related “hindering” or “drawing” ties as well, obviously for them this 
isn’t the main reason not to resettle. 
A separate note on Part II:  
Answers given by participants of the group discussions were generally similar to 
answers given during interviews; in many cases the reasons for opting out of 
resettlement where family or community related, either having unregistered or pre-
registered family members or other obligations and strong attachments to family 
members.  
However, a striking distinction which became especially apparent between the 
female and the male adult participants (as well as to some extent with the adolescent 
groups) was repeated statements such as “I would like to resettle but my husband 
doesn’t”, or “I am interested in resettlement but I have to take care of my frail 
husband/father-in-law” etc. There was a clear difference between the perceptions 
females had of resettling, and their male counterparts. Considering that group 
participants were all chosen from the “resettlement application withdrawn” group 
according to ProGres, females´ outstanding positive stance towards resettlement and 
third countries was surprising to the survey team. On the contrary, male adult 
refugees were rather “indiscriminate” or “simply not interested” to resettle, which 
was more in line with the attitude during the precedent interview part. Prospects of 
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better living standards or even helping their children to better life chances didn’t 
seem to matter for the male adult group, whereas the female discussion members 
were relatively “eager” and clearly more interested in improving their situation and 
that of their children. Still, their main reason for having dropped their application was 
family bondages as well; but answers suggested that the percentage of female 
resettlements might be considerably higher if they were not bound by patriarchal 
domination.  
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Table 1.1 Group a) Social ties and obligations 
Interview No. 4 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 33 37 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 
PRE/unreg.family 
members  
 X  X X   X   X X X  X  X   X        X X X X X X 
Fam. members 
RSTted/process of 
X  X X X X X X  X   X X  X X X X X X X   X X X X X X  X X 
Fam.members in 
Burma 
X  X X X X X X  X X X X X    X X X   X  X X X   X X X  
 
Interview No.  49 50 51 52 53 54 55 59 60 63 65 67 68 69 
PRE/unreg.family 
members 
     X X X X X  X   
Fam. members 
RSTed/process of 
X    X X  X X X  X X  
Fam. members in 
Burma 
  X X X   X X X   X X 
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Table 1.2.  All other groups 
Interview No.  2 3 5 9 11 20 24 32 34 35 36 38 48 56 57 58 61 62 64 66 70 
PRE/unreg. 
family 
members 
 X X X  X   X  X      X   X  
Fam. 
members 
RSTed/process 
of 
X X X X  X X X X X X X X  X X  X   X 
Fam. 
members in 
Burma 
X X X X X   X  X X    X X    X  
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6.4.2. Regarding b) Coping worries 
Besides social ties and obligations, relatively frequent statements by interviewees were 
connected to fears and worries of not being able to cope in a third country, concerns 
regarding lack of English, as concerns regarding a general lack of skills and training. In 
comparison to the later group discussions, answers regarding concerns and worries during 
the interview part were frequent. Rumors and other news that came back into the camp 
from resettled refugees seem to have been having a negative impact on perceptions about 
third countries and, predominantly, about the United States. Some refugees also mentioned 
preference to resettle to a smaller country, such as Finland, instead of the US. It is very likely 
that such opinions of the “best option” are influenced by such rumors that filter back into the 
general camp population. As is the tendency with gossip, negative stories tend to stick 
around the longest.  Elderly refugees were concerned about how to get by in a foreign 
country with a specific focus on assistance as they wouldn’t be able to work anymore; one 
elderly interviewee mentioned not wanting to be a burden to others. Similar statements 
came from parents with (disabled) children who were primarily concerned about childcare. 
Naturally, not having any relatives overseas was seen as a reason to stay in camp as well.  
Regarding the focus group discussions, images of third countries were predominantly 
positive throughout all groups.  Refugees were not very worried about coping or were even 
not worried at all; a participant of the female adult group mentioned the benefit to be able 
work and move freely overseas. It was suggested by almost all groups that if a person would 
work hard or had skills, he or she would get by anywhere and wouldn’t have to worry. 
However, there were some concerns about not being able to follow working hours, or of 
accidents and violence on the streets. Some mentioned that the beginning might be 
especially hard. Interestingly, as has been mentioned in the case of the Hmong resettlement 
operation, where officials in a foreign country were rather seen as “negative”, whereas 
refugees in Tham Hin mentioned the benefits of being able to rely on police and authorities 
abroad.164F166 As for the elderly, issues were generally related to old age: some mentioned that 
they felt too old to move, and would only be a burden on their children. Others were willing 
to resettle but couldn’t do so on their own (due to old age). A concern one female adult 
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participant raised was to lose one´s sense of direction and to get lost, which found common 
approval by the others.  
The difference in attitude towards resettlement and third countries between Part I and Part 
II is outstanding; Mayring notes that in group discussions it is likely that psychological 
constraints get broken through, and during interactions in the group the individual´s true 
opinions and thinking can be seen. It is often through group discussions that public opinions 
and collective attitudes of a society become revealed.165F167 This should be taken into account 
when trying to explain the divergence between answers of Part I and Part II; especially 
statements by female adults, whose answers when talking about their general wish to “leave 
their unwilling husband behind” point towards more openness in these group discussions in 
an environment of similar “peer thinking”. 
However, divergence in statements of Part I and Part II could also be due to a certain degree 
of “group pressure” – for example, if one person states not to be worried at all about 
resettlement, it may have been difficult for the others to say the opposite.   
 
6.4.3. Regarding Group c) Contention 
Apart from above reasons, contention levels in Tham Hin seem to be relatively high; several 
interviewees mentioned to “like living in the camp”; the benefits of free education, food 
rations and “being safe” were among the answers given for this. A similar attitude could be 
observed during all focus group discussions. I have also included refugees who stated that, 
rather than resettle, they would like to wait for peace in Burma, as this suggests that camp 
environments are not intolerable. Even though restriction of movement is limited and there 
is generally little entertainment or meaningful activities in the camp, there were only few 
statements of discontent and/or impatience with the current camp situation. Similarly, 
though some refugees indicated that they have some form of relation to local villages 
outside the camp (e.g. to send their children to a Thai school or to have the opportunity to 
leave the camp to get more food), there were very few remarks regarding any desire to 
integrate into Thai society. When asked where they would like to live in five years, the 
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majority of answers indicated a willingness to stay in Tham Hin – likewise, by far the most 
frequently asked question when asked if interviewees had any more things they would like 
to know was whether the interviewer knew how long the camp would continue to exist or 
how long they [refugees] would be allowed by the Thai government to remain in Tham Hin.  
The security of the camp as well as the provision of free basic services is rather good and 
stable in all of the nine camps. The cost of nutrition and other supplies is covered by outside 
funding from foreign donors (governments´ contributions to organizations/UN), private 
contributions as well as the Thai government. These funds have been more or less stable 
over the last years, with only some cuts and concerns for further reductions in the supply of 
yellow beans (one of the main stables in the camps) during the rise in food prices in 2010.166F168  
However, with the announcements of the Thai government to TBBC to limit food 
distributions only to registered persons in Tham Hin (with the exception of vulnerable 
unregistered refugees)167F169, this situation is likely to change in the near future, which may also 
influence this current level of “content” in the camp.  
 
6.4.4. Regarding Group d) Passiveness  
Another, however not as frequently, mentioned point were comments of participants which 
I have summarized under the concept of “passiveness”, meaning answers that tended to 
point  towards interviewees being simply “idle”, and not feeling any necessity to make up 
their minds about a decision; “passiveness” in the way that refugees were all inactive or 
indecisive about what to do. When asked specifically why they opted against resettlement, 
some mentioned simply no desire to move, or merely “I don’t know”. Again others showed 
an interest to resettle, but were still torn between decisions.    
At least partly this may have to do with a cultural understanding that it is impolite or too 
straight forward to be very direct about one´s personal opinion, especially in public and with 
strangers. Consequently, vague answers as the above are likely to hide other, more specific 
reasons. On the other hand however, Oliver Smith (UNHCR Resettlement officer Bangkok) 
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noted that such “indecisiveness” is a trait that has been linked to those who have been 
referred to as “fence-sitters” – refugees who simply don’t feel any need to make up their 
minds, and who are waiting for the best “country package” being offered (which some 
refugees in Ban Dong Yang and Tham Hin stated as meaning Northern European countries or 
Australia, rather than the US).  
 
6.4.5. Regarding e) No understanding 
approximately comparable in numbers to Group d) were answers which I have summarized 
under the concept of “no understanding”, meaning that answers suggested  more or less a 
willingness and/or interest to resettle, but due to being unfamiliar with the process the 
relevant cases were closed. Essentially, confusion about the application and resettlement 
process were raised regarding reasons for non-resettlement; still others mentioned that they 
had missed the deadline or some (eligible) family members hadn’t shown up for the 
interviews. When asked during the focus group discussions if participants knew that the US 
resettlement program had already been closed in November 2009, some said they thought 
this was only temporary.    
This suggests that the whole process of resettlement in Tham Hin was/still is intransparent, 
at least for some refugees; further, answers in general evidence that information circulates 
in the camp through informal channels, rather than through official material.  
Together with answers of group b) Coping worries, this suggests that still more information 
may be needed to be made available in the camps; not only the process of resettlement, 
with its various cut-off dates and obligation for interviews etc. be made more transparent, 
but also the conditions and what to expect in which third country should be explained in 
more detail in the camps, especially were resettlement is still an option.  
 
83 
 
 
6.5. Conclusion on results 
Answers given by participants suggest that reasons for opting against resettlement in Tham 
Hin are multiple. In many cases, a mix of insecurity, considerations for others and worries 
about the “unknown” play their part in the decision-making.  
Moreover, as has been pointed out, by far the greatest influence comes from the family 
itself: family members are in many cases unwilling to split the family, even though this would 
have no negative consequences for remaining family members, regardless of their status.   
The Thai government´s (in)actions regarding registrations have led over the years to a 
considerable high number of unregistered or pre-registered refugees in the camps who, 
even though receiving services and supplies, are ineligible for resettlement. Though the 
agreement of the Thai government to open limited PAB registrations again for some 
immediate unregistered family members may, in the future, enable further hundreds, if not 
more, refugees to resettle as well. 
 Apart from this, answers suggest that there is a lack of (official) information surrounding the 
general resettlement process as well as conditions and assistance in third countries. This has 
led to some interested refugees having their application dropped, as well as some applicants 
who withdrew their claim due to misinformation or lack of information about how to cope 
overseas. As every single US resettlement program in the other camps will have an eventual 
closing date in the near future, it is important to communicate to refugees the necessity of 
registering prior to the deadline, and that closure would not be temporary but permanent.  
The average family today not only in Tham Hin, but in all the other camps compromises 
registered, pre-registered as well as unregistered family members; again, this is 
predominantly connected to the Thai government´s careful position not to create a “magnet 
effect” through being too generous with registrations. However, the fact that these “mixed” 
families are not willing to split the family apart is also an indicator for something else, which 
is what I have been arguing in Chapter 5 in regard to migration theories and the failure to 
take into account conditions at “home” when trying to explain – and control –  migration 
movements. Namely, the decision to stay behind collectively goes against the general 
assumption that potential migrants “move” as soon as there is a chance, quite regardless of 
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social bonds. Also, it shows the importance of social factors which are so decisive in Tham 
Hin. Subsequently, I have aimed to underscore with the above empirical example the 
importance that family as well as kinship ties have in the decision whether to move or to 
stay; moreover in Tham Hin, these kinship ties constitute the underlying reason for the 
(unexpected) high number of resettlement withdrawals, even before the apparent 
government constraints.  
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7. Food for thought: Social dynamics and cohesion  
 
After outlining migration theories´ shortcomings in chapter five, which was followed by a 
discussion of the results of the survey in Tham Hin camp in chapter six, chapter seven will 
now recapitalize on these previous chapters; namely, we will look at questions such as what 
can be learnt from the statements made in Tham Hin camp? What do they tell us about 
motivations and dynamics in a refugee setting, vis à vis the general assumption that it is 
predominantly economic considerations that matter in most migrant`s decision whether to 
move or not? Also, as outlined in chapter three, as the previous Hmong refugee situation 
does have indeed some similarities to the current Burmese camps, we will  look back again 
to the former one, in order to identify differences and/or similarities in terms of the role that 
social aspects played back then and now.  
The social fabric, including the dynamics that develop within a enclosed refugee community 
strongly shape how the community functions, how the camp is managed, and refugees 
attitudes towards each other and the outside world. That is to say, the experience of 
becoming a refugee, including histories of flight, possible violence and being forced to live in 
an otherwise unknown, restricted community is an experience that is taken up differently by 
every refugee community. Namely, these traumatic experiences can either work cohesively, 
creating a feeling of bondage between community members; on the other hand, the 
opposite may occur as well: Especially in dire situations where survival is at stake, an 
atmosphere of “everyone for him- or herself” may prevail. Likewise, refugee camps are likely 
to have a tendency to hold more female than male refugees due to various circumstances –
in return, women´s position in the camp may be strengthened.  
These dynamics shape a refugee community, and have consequences on all aspects of camp 
life and beyond; without being able to explore every aspect of this very interesting area 
within the frame of this thesis, chapter seven will still hold a few thought-provoking points 
on this.  
 
86 
 
 
Economic considerations are the main drawing factor behind migration decisions; in terms of 
including social factors in the discussion, to a large extent transnational bonds, family 
influences across distances and the way in which absent family members (and the 
remittances they send home) shape the remaining members are areas that are usually 
considered in discussions of migration theories. However, in chapter six, Tham Hin camp has 
shown us that there are other factors as well that strongly influence migration decisions, 
which are grounded in a community´s social coherence and feelings of bonds and 
cohesiveness between its members. Although my argumentation is based on the situation 
found in a refugee camp, which is obviously different than the situation of migrant workers 
in many aspects, for both groups it is rewarding to include all aspects of social factors when 
trying to understand the dynamics of migration. 
Hence, and to come back to the introductory questions of this chapter, what can be learnt 
from survey participants in Tham Hin is clear: When trying to understand what drives 
migrants, be they migrant workers or refugees, it is insufficient to only look at  economic 
considerations, conditions in the host community, or transnational family networks. Social 
circumstances in the outgoing community matter as well. Although chapter six has shown us 
that there are indeed other reasons refugees stated for non-resettlement beside social 
attachments, such as fears and worries, or just “passiveness”, family bonds, and/or feelings 
of obligation to one´s kin or family were repeated over and over again by survey 
participants.  
Addressing the question of the current Burmese situation vis à vis the circumstances 
surrounding the Hmong resettlement operations in the past, it is worth noting that the 
family “build-up” in Wat Thamkrabok was indeed different than what we have in many of 
the Burmese camps today: As stated, one predominant picture which became apparent 
during the Tham Hin survey was that it is very common for many male refugees  in the 
current Burmese camps to leave the camp on a more or less regular basis ( which is due to 
the fact that many male Burmese laborers are engaged in seasonal work on the coast or 
construction not in the vicinity of the camp). Hence many husbands/fathers are very 
infrequently present in the camp, leaving many wives in a state of being “quasi” heads of 
household. Although many males are only temporary outside the camp and do return on a 
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time by time bases to their families in the camp, the role that women come to inhabit does 
change, which was also an issue the survey team had to deal with when deciding who to 
interview for the essential question of “Why are you not resettling?”.  
In contrast, what the observations and the available material of the Hmong refugee 
community in Wat Thamkrabok suggests is that families there were much more “complete”: 
As least prior to the tightening of entries and exits of the Wat, male Hmong would be 
engaged in day labor outside the camp, but were otherwise living in the camp. Indeed, by 
the time that the Royal Thai Government announced its final plan to resettle the whole 
remaining Hmong, the Wat community resembled more a village than an enclosed, guarded 
camp that we have today along the border. A situation of long-time or very frequent absence 
of the father/husband was not as common as it is in the Burmese camps today. Therefore, 
when resettlement operations were opened, mothers/wives opting out of resettlement due 
the father/husband being away for work and thus the wives couldn’t make a decision was 
not a main concern in the Hmong resettlement situation. As mentioned shortly in chapter 
three in connection to Hmong social build-up, there were indeed some problems when 
registrations were taken up in the Wat regarding a possible split of families due to family 
members not being able to attend registration exercises. However, this was not an issue to 
the extent as it is in the Burmese camps today.  
Also, in terms of expectations of the situation in resettlement countries, as has already been 
pointed out in chapter three, the Hmong remaining in Thailand could expect to draw on the 
support of already existing large Hmong ethnic communities especially in the United States. 
In comparison, the network and community support that Burmese refugees can expect to 
find in any of the resettlement countries at present is much smaller in numbers. A fact that 
has also been pointed out by Oliver Smith of UNHCR Thailand in his observation of the 
resettlement situation in Tham Hin is that there seems to be a dynamic developing: Namely, 
the longer resettlement operations are ongoing, and subsequently the more refugees see 
their neighbors and friends resettle, the more likely it becomes that the remaining “fence-
sitters” make up their mind to move as well.   
Another noteworthy difference to the Hmong resettlement situation is the fact that Wat 
Thamkrabok was very clearly a “dead-end”: The Royal Thai Government was very clear that 
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the remaining Hmong population at this Wat would not be allowed to stay any longer, and 
that essentially, the Hmong refugee situation which had started so many years prior was 
indeed a closed chapter. Hence, and in contrast to the situation today, there was simply no 
option to stay in the Wat. Although with the Burmese camps, as mentioned, there are also 
intentions for the future to close some if not all of the currently nine camps, this is not 
imminent; refugees on the border camps today do not face an urgent  “now or never” 
situation as the last remaining Hmong at Wat Thamkrabok had. Referring back to the 
introductory question of the Hmong versus the Burmese camp situations, again it is social 
networks, social bonds and structures that played their important part.  
 
Finally, let us address the last point mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. As the 
title of this chapter suggests, this will not come to a final conclusion but mainly points out 
questions and issues that are noteworthy indeed. 
Becoming a refugee is always a very distressing, traumatic experience in an individuals´ life; 
in the case of whole communities forced to flee, this also often entails great shifts in the 
community´s social fabric, and brings with it the need to adapt to this new situation. As a 
result, power structures inside the community are very likely to shift as well: For example, a 
refugee camp´s population often compromises more female than male refugees because the 
men are either killed/abducted beforehand (the worst case scenario), have joined 
opposition forces themselves, or, as for example in the camps along the Thai border, men 
have gone to work illegally in Thailand or elsewhere. At the same time, even though the 
build-up of a refugee camp may reflect an original village structure, the management of the 
camp, and with it the hierarchies and power structures within, are different. Obviously, 
refugees are to a large extent subject to the host government´s will and dependent on aid 
provisions from NGOs and other organizations. However, the refugee community is far from 
equal and homogenous itself, and is shaped by these new structures of authority. Inherent 
power structures within the camp community can determine not only access to resources, 
but are also an influencing factor in regard to decision-making. 
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Further, the upheaval of movement not only changes social structures but can also go as far 
as to damage social cohesion among community members: The experience of becoming a 
refugee may result in a loss of perceptions of belonging to a wider group; feelings of bonds 
with one´s community may weaken or break away completely.170 On the other hand, the 
opposite scenario is conceivable as well, in which social ties may become strengthened and 
the perception of “having to stick together” in this dire situation prevails. Notions of “we” 
against “them” developing within the camp community are a likely result. For example, as 
has become apparent in a study done in one of the Karenni refugee camps in northern 
Thailand, Dudley found out that perceiving oneself as a “refugee” or not depends essentially  
on interactions with the wider camp community and with new arrivals. Davis (1992) has 
called this cohesion a “bond of suffering”:  In Dudley´s study, “old” refugees, who had been 
one of the first to arrive in the 1990s in this Karenni camp, felt a sense of affinity and 
understanding towards newcomers, through whose stories their own suffering and 
traumatic flight history became personally re-lived, having gone themselves through very 
similar arduous experiences previously.171 The creation of such feelings of sharing common 
histories of distress and the imagined homogeneity of one´s community of suffering may 
become indeed a hindering factor when resettlement operations are underway: Perceptions 
of “letting down” one’s group may prevail, which may as well cause applications to remain 
few. For example, statements by refugees in Tham Hin such as “Camp residents have to stick 
together” or “[We] fled together, we are bound together by [the] same fate” suggest a 
similar thinking and reflect the relatively strong social cohesion inside the camp, not only 
between family members but also between the community as a whole. 
Further, self-perceptions of oneself as a “refugee” may also depend on length of 
displacement. Initially only seen as a temporary absence from “home”, Karenni refugees 
noted some emotional developments over the years, with more and more feelings of 
lethargy, depression and general frustration with their situation dominating the camp 
atmosphere. It could be said that from being newcomers in a camp, it is time that actually 
transforms new arrivals into refugees who, little by little, start perceiving themselves as such 
                                                      
170
 Cf. McLean 1999:1-13 
171
 Cf. Dudley 2010:44f 
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as well. Hence, once resettlement is offered, this might be more willingly accepted if 
lethargy and a general feeling of “having given up on returning home” have already set in. 
The above mentioned unavoidable shifts in power structures that develop within the 
refugee camp ought to be taken into account for every aspect of camp management. 
However, such inherent (new) power hierarchies and re-definitions of status are likely to 
have an influence on women´s roles as well; especially as the gaps that men create by not 
being present with their families in the camp are taken over by the wife/mother. For 
example, as mentioned before, in Tham Hin the majority of men are at least temporarily 
outside of the camp for work or have stayed behind with opposition forces in Burma.  Hence 
even though the formal head of household may still be the father/husband, the role of the 
mother/wife is very likely to have become strengthened in the camp environment. As 
Moussa and McSpadden (1993) have observed:  
[T]raditional social and cultural fabric of life is rent apart in unpredictable ways [and often…] 
takes away the assumed permanence of the social relationships between men and women. 
There is, therefore, the likely consequence of a shift in the previously experienced and 
expected power hierarchies and power differentials.”
172   
In how far women´s roles has actually changed would obviously need a profound 
background knowledge of the social build-up of the original community (for the case of 
Tham Hin, one would have to look at social structures and gender-roles in Karen 
communities). The strengthening of women´s roles in absence of the husband/father has 
become “famous” not in the here discussed context of refugee movements, but rather in 
studies of work migration movements in countries where going abroad for (temporary) work 
has become the norm and, indeed, is often seen as a part of the life-cycle.173 There, the 
often long-term absence of the husband and the new responsibilities that are put on the 
wife result in a redefinition of (gender) roles in the household, which would otherwise be 
clearly defined. It is easy to understand that the increased autonomy of the wife in the 
absence of the husband may however lead to tensions once the husband returns.  
                                                      
172
 Moussa/McSpadden (1993) in McLean 1999:6, second bracket in the original. 
173
 For example, extensive studies have dealt with changes in women´s role in countries such as the Philippines 
or India.  
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In the here discussed case of power hierarchies in refugee camp settings, the above 
consideration has to be taken into account: the fact that a large part of male refugee 
population is either temporary or permanently outside of camp creates “quasi” single-
mother households, in which the decision-making falls on the wife. In regard to crucial 
decisions such as resettlement, it would therefore be distorting to concentrate only on male 
head of households, with the assumption that they are the sole dominators of the 
household.  
However above arguments, such as strength of solidarity within the camp community and 
shifted power relations between its members and within families, are not exclusive; even 
though certain conclusions could be drawn by Dudley´s study in one of the Karenni camps as 
described above, and the situation seems to be reflected in Tham Hin, the situation may 
differ significantly in other refugee situations. There, the distress of camp life may well 
create feelings of “every man/woman for him/herself” – if resettlement is offered in such an 
environment, outcomes may differ hugely from the results presented in this paper.  In the 
case of Karenni refugees, sharing a common history of trauma has apparently created a 
feeling of community and of mutual affinity, in which ethnic belonging seems to be of minor 
importance.174 However, the opposite may well be true in other situations where ethnic 
composition does play a role. Namely, in situations where the relevant refugee population is 
made up of different ethnic groups, who have fled and ended up in the same refugee camp, 
perceptions of “we as one refugee community” may well be weak or non-existent.  
 
Finally, the above discussion of dynamics and power hierarchies within a refugee community 
are well beyond the scope of this thesis. Again, as every refugee situation and every refugee 
camp is different, every one of them has to be judged on a case-by-case basis. However, the 
discussion keeps its direction in pointing towards the necessity to look more closely at the 
social structures of the sending community, instead of merely assuming that individuals will 
move on the whim of economic betterment. 
                                                      
174
 However, one ought to take into consideration that the majority of the population in the camp that Dudley 
studied is Karen; ethnic differences, therefore, are obviously not a major issue. 
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8. Conclusion – lessons learnt (?) 
 
 As has been preliminarily pointed out, migration research has moved forward from 
Ravenstein´s “Laws of Migration” and its emphasis on purely economic motivations. 
Nevertheless what can be seen today in migration research is a somewhat still prevailing 
concentration on economic factors. The assumption that “migrants move to where economic 
opportunities are better” is still very much present in the discourse about international 
migration and in national policies concerning immigration regulations. Admittedly, migration 
research has expanded: Social phenomena such as transnational networks connecting and 
influencing family and community members across geographical distances has made 
significant contributions to understand migration movements; moreover, in terms of what 
triggers and also what sustains migration, there have been much needed add-ons to the 
conventional assumption of purely economic factors. An area that receives very much 
attention from migration scholars as well as from national governments is integration, and 
the various factors, including social ones, that influence this process. Also, one has to admit 
that prospects of economic betterment are indeed one of the main motivating factors for 
many migrants and refugees alike, the latter having an understandably strong desire to 
escape their dire living environments and seek a better future.  
Still, however diversified the discussion surrounding migration has become, what I have 
been arguing in this thesis is the still relative neglect of social structures in the home 
community. I have pointed out, with the empirical example of Tham Hin camp, that those 
conditions are influencing individuals, much in the way that they are pushed or pulled by 
destination country conditions or the economic and/or political situation at home.  
As for the case study of Tham Hin camp, over time, it seems, the “willingness” to eventually 
resettle does indeed increase as refugees see their neighbors and friends depart and positive 
feedback of third country conditions arrives back in the camp. This reflects what has been 
touched upon in chapter five with the concept of “chain migration”, and which is closely 
connected to developments of transnational links between sending and receiving country. 
Consequently, developments of Burmese refugees are likely to follow what we have seen in 
the case of the Hmong resettlements – provided that families are given the option to 
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resettle as a whole. In that the case of the Hmong, after some stable Hmong communities 
had been established in the US and other third countries, the remaining Hmong from 
Thailand were following suit rather soon, as the “ethnic security net” was already 
established overseas.  
Yet, the main problem regarding Burmese refugees in the camps in Thailand resembles, in a 
way, a “vicious circle” and is much more complicated that the situation has been in the  case 
of the Hmong: Burmese refugees who are attached to unregistered (and thus resettlement-
ineligible) family members are likely to stay behind as well. The percentage of people 
definitely remaining in camp despite their neighbors steadily departing is comparatively high 
(around 30% in Tham Hin). Yet the Thai government, for fear of creating a “magnet effect”, 
on the other hand, is unwilling to be more generous with registrations. Very likely, a major 
part of this now remaining 30% of Tham Hin residents would be willing to move as well if 
their relocation would include their unregistered family members. However, simply making 
resettlement for all currently residing refugees in Tham Hin possible would make it very 
likely that the number of new arrivals subsequently rises. Hence the Thai government is very 
reluctant and careful with opening the PAB registration process in the camp again. 
Compared to the Hmong resettlement, the current situation therefore differs depending on 
the political willingness of all sides.  
However, as there have recently been at least some speedily done registrations for 
immediate family members of refugees waiting to resettle, it seems the Thai government 
has by now realized the aforementioned problem and the “strings attached” persisting in the 
camp community. Yet achieving a resettlement figure closer to the 100% bench mark would 
necessitate a very generous approach by the government. Considering Bangkok´s 
understandably concerns, this is unlikely to occur in the near future and under current 
conditions. Further, statements by Bangkok indicating plans to close the camps in the near 
future and already implemented cutting of food rations make it clear that patience is 
running low and that Bangkok as well is eagerly looking for a final solution.     
Assumptions held prior to the study in Tham Hin concerning reasons for non-resettlement 
were confirmed with this survey; what has been achieved therefore is the affirmation that it 
is primarily social bonds that prevent this relatively high number of eligible refugees to opt 
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against resettlement. However, as mentioned, there is relatively little room for maneuvering 
possible.  
The political situation in Burma has not improved over recent years, and is likely to remain 
volatile; in terms of durable solutions available for Burmese refugees, this means that 
resettlement will continue to be the most realistic option. The challenge will be to make 
resettlement possible for all current camp residents, and to allow for whole families to 
resettle together, while at the same time preventing new arrivals from increasing – it 
remains to be seen how far the recent political improvements reflect positively on the camps 
and new arrivals. 
Finally, Tham Hin stands as an example in the debate against the general notion that 
migrants, as well as refugees, are willing to move at all costs and at the first chance possible 
to the “West”. This argumentation is widely spread, especially in the political arena, as a 
convenient argument to justify tighter border controls, restrictions on the labor market or 
integration problems.  
It has therefore been my aim to provide data and material for challenging this assumption. 
Moreover, one lesson learnt from past measures to regulate or prevent migration ought to 
be that migration is far from a “tap” that can simply be opened or closed according to a 
nation´s or region´s needs, but rather constitutes a dynamic and flexible flow of human 
beings, who are obviously socially connected in various ways and various directions. In as 
much as migrants are indeed influenced by economic factors, in as much they are socially 
influenced.  
Finally, as examples on studies such as Tham Hin are relatively few, it is my hope that the 
here presented empirical example provides guidance for similar refugee situations 
concerning issues of resettlement. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1. Appendix I: Worldwide UNHCR Resettlement Submissions vs. Departures 
2003-2010 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Submissions 35,314 39,509 46,260 54,182 98,999 120,800 128,558 108,086 
Departures 27,338 42,008 38,507 29,560 49,868 65,548 84,657 72,942 
 Source: UNHCR Global Resettlement Statistical Report 2009;UNHCR 2010a,2011 Resettlement Fact Sheets 
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9.2. Appendix II: Camp population numbers 2007-2011 
Camp 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Ban Kwai/Nai Soi 18,913 19,406 13,499 12,349 11,253 
 Ban Mae Surin 3,448 3,531 3,133 2,246 2,090 
 Mae La Oon 13,746 13,823 14,400 12,579 10,720 
Mae Ra Ma Luang 11,775 11,492 13,910 12,088 10,943 
 Mae La 39,239 33,962 31,173 30,287 28,156 
Umpiem Mai 19,851 14,505 12,948 12,196 11,293 
 Nu Po 13,779 11,515 10,202 9,664 8,984 
Ban Don Yang 3,659 3,674 3,158 2,942 2,796 
Tham Hin 
6,025  
(7,978) 
5,08 
(8,091) 
4,605 
(8,013) 
4,293 
(7,559) 
4,254  
(7,686) 
Source: TBBC; numbers as of December each year, except for 2011 which is July 2011 and at the time of writing 
the most recent count. 
Note: Numbers are registered and pending PAB (pre-screened) only; TBBC numbers are higher 
because all individuals who receive food rations are included, irrespective if registered by UNHCR or 
PAB or not (for comparison, TBBC numbers in Tham Hin camp are included in brackets). 
 
9.3. Appendix III: UNHCR Resettlement numbers  
Source: Smith/UNHCR 2010: 3 
Note: Row 2 includes only registered person (registered by PAB = eligible for resettlement); row 3 
shows resident numbers had there been no resettlement. 
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9.4. Appendix IV: Questions of Focus Group Discussions 
• Is there anybody who has relatives/family members overseas? Do you know where? Do you 
know when they left the camp? Are you in contact with them/have you heard from them 
since they left? 
 
• What comes to your mind if you think about a country overseas (meaning a RST country)? 
What are your impressions/feelings when you think about ‘abroad’?  
 
• Have you heard from friends/neighbors/other community members (who are already RST) 
about their experiences in their new country? 
If yes, what did they tell you/what did you hear? Do you think it’s true what they 
tell? 
If no (haven’t heard anything), would you like to hear more about moving to another 
country/what it is like to live in an overseas country? Would you be interested to get 
more information? 
• What do you think would be the most difficult part about resettling? If you think about that 
you would go, what would you be worried about (e.g. know nobody overseas, don’t know the 
language, culture, no support available)? 
• What were the reasons for your decision (not to resettle)? Do other group members have the 
same reason? 
 
• Was it an easy decision?  If yes, why were you so sure about it? If no, then how did you think 
first and what made you change your mind in the end?  What did your other family members 
say? Maybe they thought otherwise? 
• Image somebody from UNHCR/OPE came up to you and asked you to tell him/her anything 
that they could do for you to make you resettle; what would you tell them? What could they 
change/what would you ask them to do for you?  
 
• We talked about problems that might arise when moving; could you think of a group which 
might have some other difficulties? Problems that you yourself wouldn’t have? (e.g. single 
parents, persons with disabilities etc.) 
 
• What are your plans for the next years/your intentions? What do you think you will be doing 
in, say five years from now? 
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9.5. Appendix V: Map of Thai refugee camps   
 
Source: TBBC 
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9.6. Appendix VI:  Map of Karen settlements 
 
Source: Cooler 1995: no page 
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Thesis Summary 
This thesis centers on resettlement operations in one of the nine Burmese refugee camps 
situated along the Thai-Burma border in Thailand, and the social dynamics that influence 
refugees whether to resettle or not.  
Thailand is host to Burmese refugees since approximately 20 years, for whom resettlement 
has become the only durable solution due to the impossibility of return or local integration 
into Thailand.  The US has one of the largest resettlement operations out of Thailand, and 
has resettled since the start of the program in 2005 approximately 80,000 refugees. Other 
resettlement opportunities, although smaller in scale, are to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
as well as to some European countries.  
This thesis is the outcome of a survey which was conducted by UNHCR in the summer of 
2010 in Tham Hin camp, which is the most southern and the longest standing camp in 
Thailand; the aim of the study was to better understand motivations of refugees opting 
against resettlement, whose figure stands at approximately 30% of the camp population.  
As it became apparent, many refugees were withdrawing their resettlement applications 
due to other family members unable to resettle together, which is due to the complex 
process and preconditions of registrations of refugees in the camps.  
Hence even though individually eligible to resettle, many refugees chose to stay behind with 
their unregistered family members.  
Migration theories in general have tended to focus very predominantly on economic 
considerations as to what influences migration decisions; the role that social factors play, be 
it for migrant workers or refugees, has only become included in migration theories relatively 
recently, mostly focusing on transnational family networks, influences on the remaining 
family or issues of local integration.  However, as the survey in Tham Hin camp has shown, 
social bonds in the outgoing community may likewise have significant influence on the 
decision whether to move or not.  
Hence it is my aim to provide the reader not only with insights into the social fabric of a 
refugee community in Thailand, but also importantly to add the aspect of social bonds in the 
sending community to the discussions of migration theories. I argue that to these social 
factors tend to be neglected in debate surrounding what influences migrants` decisions 
whether to move or not. Although admittedly economic considerations are in many cases 
determining factors, especially for migrants, Tham Hin stands as a rare empirical example 
showing us that social bonds and considerations for family and community members can 
indeed be overriding the desire for economic betterment.  
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Diplomarbeits-Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit konzentriert sich auf die Situation in einem der neun 
Flüchtlingscamps an der Grenze zu Burma in Thailand und die inneren sozialen Dynamiken, 
die Entscheidungen zu Weiterwanderung beeinflussen.  
Obwohl Thailand bereits seit ca. 20 Jahren burmesische Flüchtlinge beherbergt ist lokale 
Integration oder freiwillige Rückkehr nach Burma keine realistische Option, was 
Weiterwanderung als die sicherste Lösung für burmesische Flüchtlinge in Thailand macht. Als 
eines der größten Weiterwanderungsprogramme der USA sind hiermit seit 2005 ca. 80,000 
Flüchtlinge nach Amerika übersiedelt worden. Weitere Aufnahmeländer, obgleich nicht im 
Ausmaß der USA, sind Australien, Neuseeland, Kanada sowie einige europäische Staaten.  
Die hier vorliegende Diplomarbeit gründet sich auf eine Studie des UNHCR, der im Sommer 
2010 Gründe und Motivationen von Flüchtlingen in Tham Hin untersucht hatte, die sich 
gegen Weiterwanderung entschieden hatten. Diese Entwicklung war dahingehend 
überraschend, da es gegen die generelle Annahme geht, Flüchtlinge bzw. MigrantInnen 
ergriffen jede sich bietende Gelegenheit, in den „Westen“ zu übersiedeln. Besonders der 
relativ hohe Prozentsatz von ca. 30% „Nicht-Wanderungswilligen“ war für alle Beteiligten 
überraschend.  
Ähnliche Annahmen finden sich in Diskussionen rund um Migrationstheorien: MigrantInnen 
bzw. Flüchtlinge migrieren basierend schlicht auf Kosten-Nutzen Überlegungen. Soziale 
Faktoren sind zwar mehr und mehr integriert in gängige Diskussionen, bleiben jedoch 
überwiegend beschränkt auf transnationale Familienbande, Einflüsse auf die 
zurückbleibende Gemeinde bzw. Familie, oder Integrationsprozesse in der host community. 
Das Einflusspotential der outgoing community und die hier inhärenten sozialen Bande 
bleiben weitgehend außen vor.  
Die hier vorliegende Diplomarbeit soll einen Beitrag zur Migrationstheorie-Debatte leisten, 
indem am Beispiel von Tham Hin gezeigt wird, wie soziale Überlegungen und Familienbande 
maßgeblich Migrationsentscheidungen beeinflussen können. Auch wenn ökomische 
Überlegungen und Erwartungen tatsächlich einer der Hauptfaktoren in 
Migrationsentscheidungen spielen, und sich selbstverständlich die Lage von MigrantInnen 
und Flüchtlingen in wichtigen Punkten unterscheiden mag, möchte ich in der hier 
vorliegenden Arbeit das Einflusspotential sozialer Faktoren in der Heimatgemeinde 
darstellen und hiermit einen Beitrag zur Diskussion um Dynamiken und Motivation von 
Migrationsbewegungen leisten.  
 
 
 
111 
 
 
Lebenslauf 
Persönliche Daten 
Susanne Christine WALTER 
Email    susanne.walter@mail.com 
Geboren   Oktober 1984 
Staatsbürgerschaft  Deutsch 
 
Bildungsweg 
 
März 2006 – derzeit: Individuelles Diplomstudium Internationale Entwicklung, Universität 
Wien 
Thematischer Schwerpunkt: Migrations- und Flüchtlingsproblematik, mit geographischem 
Fokus auf Südostasien sowie Ostasien 
Diplomarbeitstitel:  „Invited but not (always) willing to go – Refugees in Tham Hin camp 
(Thailand) as an example of migration theories´ shortcomings” 
Relevante Kurse:  
- SE Migrationssoziologie SS 2010  
- SE Demokratiebewegung in Thailand SS 2010 
- SE Migration und Entwicklung, Ansätze und Diskurse SS 2010 
- VO Migrations-, Staatsangehörigkeits- und Integrationstheorie WS 2009 
- AG  Internationale Migration WS 2009 
- SE Southeast Asian Society I and II 2009, Yokohama City University,  Japan 
- SE Southeast Asian Studies 2008, Mahidol Universität Bangkok 
- SE The History of East Asia in the Modern Age 2008, Mahidol Universität Bangkok 
- SE Entwicklungspolitik: Krisen und Konflikte in Südostasien WS 2007 
- SE Ökon. und politische Entwicklung Japans und Südkoreas SS 2007 
- SE Ökon. u. politische Entwicklung Chinas u. Nordkoreas WS 2006 
- SE Politik internationaler Beziehungen: Systeme Südostasiens WS 2006 
     
Okt. 2005 – Juli 2010:  Studium Japanologie (Abschluss BA Juli 2010)  
Bakkalaureatsarbeitstitel:  „Die Entwicklung des japanischen Asylsystems“ 
2000 - 2004  Ernährungswissenschaftliches Gymnasium Justus-von-Liebig, Aalen, 
Abschluss: Abitur  
112 
 
 
1994 - 2000 Realschule Bopfingen, Abschluss Mittlere Reife 
1990 - 1994  Grundschule Bopfingen, Deutschland 
   
Berufserfahrung 
 
Oktober 2011 – März 2012 Praktikum International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), Bangkok, Bereich Resettlement   
Januar – September 2011 Gallup Institut Wien, Assistenz der Recruiting-Abteilung 
Oktober – November 2010  Organisational Committee AIESEC Austria für die 
„Future I“ Konferenz (10.11.-14.11.), Bereich 
Eventmanagement 
 
Juli – September 2010  Praktikum UNHCR Thailand, Kanchanaburi suboffice  
 
Oktober – Dezember 2009 „Buddy“ Ausbildung für die Integrationshilfe von 
unbegleiteten minderjährigen Flüchtlingen, 
Integrationshaus Wien 
Januar 2009 - August 2009    Praktikum „Human Rights Now“, Tokyo 
August 2007 Praktikum im Bezirksamt Arakawa, Tokyo 
 
Stipendien und Prüfungen 
 
• Carlo-Schmid Stipendium zur Förderung Deutscher in Intl. Organisationen  
(Oktober 2011 – März 2012) 
• DAAD Stipendium für Kurzpraktika in Intl. Organisationen (Juli – September 2010)  
 
• Joint Study Stipendium für Auslandsjahr, Japan (September 2008 – September 2009) 
 
• Juni 2010: Berlitz Sprachtest English Proficiency, Ergebnis „sehr gut“ 
 
• Juni 2009: Japanese Language Proficiency Test (JLPT), Level 1 
 
Stand: November 2011 
